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Evans and Wolf: A Faustian Bargain that Undermines Research Participants’ Privacy

A FAUSTIAN BARGAIN THAT UNDERMINES RESEARCH
PARTICIPANTS’ PRIVACY RIGHTS AND RETURN OF RESULTS
Barbara J. Evans* and Susan M. Wolf **
Abstract
A 2018 committee report published by the highly respected National
Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (the Report)
recommends stripping research participants of crucial data privacy rights
and discarding decades of carefully deliberated consensus guidelines for
the ethical return of results and data from research. This Article traces
these disturbing recommendations to three root causes: (1) a statement of
task that blocked careful and impartial analysis of a disputed legal matter
central to the Report; (2) a piecemeal legal analysis that omitted relevant
strands of law; and (3) the inappropriate conflation of two distinct
concepts—the return of individual research results (the stated subject of
the Report) and privacy-enabling individual access rights, which have a
nearly fifty-year legal history long predating the modern debate about
return of results. The Report’s recommendations would erect new barriers
to the return of results and, simultaneously, dial back a core data privacy
right that Americans—including many research participants—currently
enjoy. We urge extreme caution in implementing this Report’s flawed
recommendations. Congress has elevated the right to see one’s personal
information to the status of a civil right in many different data
environments. Diminishing individual access in the research context
erodes its status as a right more broadly.
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Faustian bargain: a pact whereby a person trades
something of supreme moral or spiritual importance, such
as personal values or the soul, for some worldly or material
benefit, such as knowledge, power, or riches. . . . Faustian
bargains are by their nature tragic or self-defeating for the
person who makes them, because what is surrendered is
ultimately far more valuable than what is obtained, whether
or not the bargainer appreciates that fact.1
INTRODUCTION: AN ASSAULT ON LONGSTANDING RIGHTS
TO SEE ONE’S OWN DATA
For nearly fifty years, federal, state, and global lawmakers have
created rights to access one’s own data as a crucial dimension of privacy
rights.2 Without the ability to access your data, you cannot spot errors,
assess the privacy threat posed by circulation of those data, or determine
whether to consent to sharing and secondary uses. In the United States,
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)3
Privacy Rule4 has applied this access right to health information,
including research-generated information, for nearly two decades.5 Yet it
continues to meet resistance, motivating some states to threaten (and
some to enact) data-ownership statutes.6
Meanwhile, on a separate track, commentators since at least 19807
have urged that researchers offer to share with research participants their
individual-specific research results and incidental findings in the ethical
conduct of research, with endorsement of this practice in consensus
reports since 1999.8 While the appropriate scope of return has been
debated, the basic importance of return of results and incidental or
secondary findings is now widely recognized, funded by the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) in many studies, and globally practiced.9
However, this too continues to meet resistance.
1. Faustian
Bargain,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA
(emphasis
added),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Faustian-bargain [https://perma.cc/SG95-TUM3].
2. See infra Section II.B.
3. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C. (2012)).
4. See 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2018).
5. See infra Section II.B.
6. See infra note 14.
7. See Philip Reilly, When Should an Investigator Share Raw Data with the Subjects?,
IRB, Nov. 1980, at 4, 5.
8. See NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN BIOLOGICAL
MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE 71–72 (1999). For discussion of subsequent
consensus recommendations, see infra text accompanying note 68.
9. See discussion infra Section II.A.
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Both of these domains raise questions of science, medicine, law, and
ethics. Progress requires rigorous analysis on all fronts. Yet progress is
now endangered by a 2018 report from the National Academies of
Science, Engineering, and Medicine (the Report).10 The Academies, a
prestigious and highly influential body that has advised the federal
government since the Civil War,11 convened a committee to analyze and
issue recommendations on return of results and individual access to data.
In a stunning departure from the usually excellent quality of Academies
reports, this Report failed to provide a thorough legal analysis, thus
dooming the Report’s many legal and regulatory recommendations.
Worse, the Report conflated the legally separate domains of HIPAA
access and return of results. The damage and danger are real. At a time
of great progress toward transparency in research, partnership with
research participants, and true engagement with research participant
communities, the Report threatens to turn back the clock, endangering
long-established privacy rights and stalling return of results.
In the domain of privacy, not only has the Report recommended that
regulators gut current privacy rights, but the Report adds fuel to a highly
problematic movement to grant individuals ownership rights in their own
data—a change that would endanger biomedical research and progress.
The metaphor of individual data ownership persists in popular discourse
about research ethics and data privacy12 despite fairly wide scholarly
agreement that data ownership has serious conceptual and practical
flaws.13 A few states recognize property rights14 or have considered doing

10. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., RETURNING INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH RESULTS

TO PARTICIPANTS: GUIDANCE FOR A NEW RESEARCH PARADIGM (Jeffrey R. Botkin et al. eds., 2018)

[hereinafter REPORT].
11. See History of the National Academies, NAT’L ACADS. SCI., ENGINEERING, & MED.,
http://www.nationalacademies.org/about/history/index.html [https://perma.cc/EA2B-PBFD].
12. See Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L.
REV. 135, 141 (2004) (noting that references to ownership “will likely stick” in public discourse
about data privacy, because the concept of property is widely familiar to people and captures
aspirations people harbor about being able to control access to their data).
13. See, e.g., Amy L. McGuire et al., Who Owns the Data in a Medical Information
Commons?, 47 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 62, 62–63 (2019) (discussing practical and legal pros and cons
of individual data ownership).
14. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010(a)(2) (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-31104.7(1)(a) (2018); FLA. STAT. § 760.40(2)(a) (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1(1) (2018); see
also Seth Axelrad, State Statutes Declaring Genetic Information to be Personal Property,
http://www.aslme.org/dna_04/reports/axelrad4.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DSY-NSX7] (discussing
state data ownership statutes).
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so15 for certain kinds of data, most notably genetic information.16 At the
federal level, however, Congress rejected data ownership as a tool for
privacy protection almost fifty years ago17 and instead embraced a civil
rights model of data privacy.18 Instead of declaring that people own their
data and letting courts elaborate the rights and duties ownership entails,
Congress has tried to enunciate a core set of rights people should have
when their personal data are stored, used, and shared by others.19
These rights are created by federal privacy statutes, such as the
Privacy Act of 1974,20 and by privacy regulations Congress authorized
when passing other statutes such as HIPAA and the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA).21 In many respects, they resemble the
same “bundle of sticks”22 people would have if they owned their data23
15. See, e.g., H.B. 1220, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015); H.B. 1260, 87th Leg. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2012); H.B. 2110, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011).
16. See, e.g., Jennifer K. Wagner & Dan Vorhaus, On Genetic Rights and States: A Look at
South Dakota and Around the U.S., PRIVACY REP. (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.genomics
lawreport.com/index.php/2012/03/20/on-genetic-rights-and-states-a-look-at-south-dakota-andaround-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/JX9U-NJ97] (discussing genetic data ownership laws).
17. See infra notes 125–26 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s finding that the
federal Privacy Act enables the exercise of constitutionally protected civil rights).
18. See Barbara J. Evans, HIPAA’s Individual Right of Access to Genomic Data:
Reconciling Safety and Civil Rights, 102 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 5, 5–6 (2018); Kathy L. Hudson
et al., Keeping Pace with the Times—The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008,
358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2661, 2662 (2008) (characterizing the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 as civil rights legislation); see also George J. Annas et al., GINA,
Genism, and Civil Rights, 22 BIOETHICS ii, iii (2008) (“Senator Judd Gregg has termed GINA ‘the
first civil rights bill of the 21st Century,’ a phrase often quoted by the Senate's main sponsor of
the bill, Senator Olympia Snow and others, and endorsed by the American Civil Liberties Union
as well.”). There is a long history of using medical research generally and genetics specifically as
instruments of discrimination by race and ethnicity. See generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL
INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (2012); HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID: THE DARK HISTORY OF
MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION ON BLACK AMERICANS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT
(2006). For a recent report from China showing the importance of access to one’s own research
data and results in order to protect against discrimination and abuse, see Sui-Lee Wee, China Uses
DNA to Track Its People, With the Help of American Expertise, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/business/china-xinjiang-uighur-dna-thermo-fisher.html
[https://perma.cc/ASM5-8VSN].
19. See infra notes 125–26 and accompanying text (discussing the enacted findings of fact
Congress included in the Privacy Act of 1974).
20. Pub. L. No. 93–579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012)).
21. Pub. L. 110–233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
& 42 U.S.C.).
22. See Jessica L. Roberts, Progressive Genetic Ownership, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1105,
1129 (2018) (tracing the history of the “bundle of sticks” characterization of the set of entitlements
that ownership provides).
23. Barbara J. Evans, Much Ado About Data Ownership, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 69, 74
(2011) (noting that HIPAA’s privacy rights are “strikingly similar” to rights inherent in
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but, technically, they are federal civil rights instead of ownership rights.
With this artful strategy, Congress was able to provide a federal floor of
privacy protections that somewhat resemble data ownership, without
inviting challenges by declaring people “owners” of their own data and
without encroaching on the states’ traditional prerogative to establish the
limits of property law and regulate relationships such as those between
individuals and health care institutions.24
One of the privacy rights Congress has consistently protected, dating
back to the early 1970s, is the individual’s right of access to one’s own
data—that is, a right for people to inspect and receive copies of personal
information that others are storing, using, and disclosing about them.25
Individual control, rather than secrecy, is central to the modern paradigm
of data privacy,26 and people obviously have no control if they cannot
even see what their data contain or gain access to their records. Privacyrelated access mimics the right of ingress that inheres in property
ownership—a right to enter and inspect one’s property.
Some data holders, for various reasons, resist having to provide this
access, and individual access rights are not always vigorously enforced.27
The Academies’ Report observed that providing individual access to data
and results at research laboratories is burdensome for researchers and
might reduce their productivity.28 The Report stresses that funds for
biomedical research “are precious and require careful and responsible
stewardship,” so that letting participants have data access “necessarily
ownership). See generally Roberts, supra note 22 (characterizing privacy-related access rights as
functionally similar to ownership interests).
24. As discussed above, a few states have created property rights in certain types of data
such as genetic information. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 22, at 1128 n.160 (listing five states—
Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana that treat genetic information as the property
of the person the data describe); id. at 1128 n.161 (listing states that have considered genetic data
ownership legislation); supra notes 14, 15 and accompanying text. However, many more states
have rejected individual ownership of medical or genetic information in favor of creating strong
individual access rights as an aspect of state privacy law. See, e.g., Individual Access to Medical
Records: 50 State Comparison, HEALTH INFO. & L., www.healthinfolaw.org/comparativeanalysis/individual-access-medical-records-50-state-comparison [https://perma.cc/9S33-WWUP].
25. See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text.
26. Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 820 (2000).
27. See, e.g., Carolyn T. Lye et al., Assessment of U.S. Hospital Compliance with
Regulations for Patients’ Requests for Medical Records, [J]AMA NETWORK OPEN (Oct. 5, 2018),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2705850 [https://perma.cc/R386XHG6] (providing empirical data demonstrating the difficulty individuals experience exercising
their HIPAA access rights); see also Steven Keating, Curiosity, Serendipity, and a Brain Tumor,
MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602914/curiosityserendipity-and-a-brain-tumor/ [https://perma.cc/KG6M-MLPT] (chronicling the author’s
difficulty obtaining access to his own genomic test results from research).
28. REPORT, supra note 10, at 59, 73–74, 124, 165–66.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol71/iss5/5

6

Evans and Wolf: A Faustian Bargain that Undermines Research Participants’ Privacy

2019]

A FAUSTIAN BARGAIN

1287

requires the diversion of some research resources from the primary goal
of the research.”29 In short, honoring people’s right to see their own
results and data generated during research is inconvenient.30
This kind of failure to provide access enhances pressure for
statehouses to enact data-ownership laws to give people desired control
over their data.31 A patchwork of state data-ownership bills, if enacted,
would strengthen individual access but could impede the availability of
data for research and other socially beneficial uses. Attempts to weaken
existing federal individual access rights thus invite serious unintended
consequences for biomedical research, which increasingly relies on data
as fuel for discovery.
This Article explores how the Academies’ Report, which is entitled,
“Returning Individual Results to Research Participants,”32 would affect
research participants’ privacy rights while also undermining the ethical
practice of returning results and data. The Academies are independent,
private bodies that trace their lineage to a congressional charter President
Lincoln signed in 1863.33 They appoint expert committees to conduct
studies of policy questions that require scientific or medical insights and
analysis.34 “The reports of the Academies are viewed as being valuable
and credible because of the institution’s reputation for providing
29. Id. at 59.
30. See Inconvenient, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
inconvenient [https://perma.cc/D8UA-A273] (defining “inconvenient” as “[c]ausing trouble,
difficulties, or discomfort”). For an example of a regulation recognizing narrow circumstances in
which access can be temporarily suspended, see 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(2)(iii) (2018) (noting that
there are limited circumstances in which access can be suspended—when providing research
participants access to their own data and results during conduct of a clinical trial could “un-blind”
the trial and invalidate the research—and providing a narrow exception allowing access to be
suspended temporarily during the trial and requiring access to be reinstated once the trial is
complete). However, the Report’s argument that access is burdensome and might reduce research
productivity is made far more broadly than this HIPAA limited exception envisions. See REPORT,
supra note 10, at 59, 73–74, 124, 165–66.
31. See, e.g., Leonard J. Kish & Eric J. Topol, Unpatients—Why Patients Should Own Their
Medical Data, 33 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 921, 922 (2015) (arguing that individual ownership
of data would serve important interests not being served by current rights of access and control);
Eric J. Topol, The Big Medical Data Miss: Challenges in Establishing an Open Medical Resource,
16 NATURE REVS. 253, 253 (2015) (calling for data ownership).
32. See REPORT, supra note 10.
33. Who We Are, NAT’L ACADS. SCI., ENGINEERING, & MED., http://www.national
academies.org/about/whoweare/index.html [https://perma.cc/9S9P-W6RJ].
34. See Guidelines for the Review of Reports of the National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine, NAT’L ACADS. SCI., ENGINEERING, & MED., http://www.national
academies.org/nasem/na_067075.html [https://perma.cc/VX47-QL6B] (“The rationale for any
findings, conclusions, and recommendations should be fully explained in the report. This
explanation might include references to the literature, analysis of data, or a description of the pros
and cons of the range of alternatives and the reasons for preferring a particular option.”).
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independent, objective, and nonpartisan advice with high standards of
scientific and technical quality.”35 The Academies describe themselves as
“the nation’s pre-eminent source of high-quality, objective advice on
science, engineering, and health matters.”36
The sponsor of a study—often a federal agency—works with the
Academies to agree on a statement of task (SOT) that defines the scope
of work.37 “Most studies are funded by those requesting the advice,” with
costs ranging “from about $200,000 to more than $1 million,” which is
free of any fees for the subject-matter experts serving on the study
committee, because they volunteer their time.38 The majority of studies
are paid for by federal agencies.39
The Academies generally follow a policy of self-imposed restraint
when recommending changes to federal statutes and regulations. The
Academies’ criteria for reports thus state that recommendations calling
for the adoption of specific legislation are “[o]f particular concern” and
“should be avoided unless specifically called for in the study charge.”40
This approach displays respect for the rule of law and for the
Constitution, which entrusts Congress—and the agencies Congress
authorizes—to make our federal laws and regulations.
When a study addresses legal questions, the Academies’ “high
standards of . . . technical quality”41 demand the same excellence that the
Academies require when analyzing questions of science, engineering,
and medicine. This means that reports discussing the law should meet
legal professional standards. Those standards require accurate statements
of law based on thorough legal research,42 not just when representing
clients in a practice setting, but also when providing “law-related

35. See Our Study Process, NAT’L ACADS. SCI., ENGINEERING, & MED.,
http://www.nationalacademies.org/nasem/na_064188.html [https://perma.cc/AL6W-GW9N].
36. See What We Do, NAT’L ACADS. SCI., ENGINEERING, & MED., http://www.national
academies.org/about/whatwedo/index.html [https://perma.cc/V4BA-N6J5].
37. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., WORKING WITH THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES: A
GUIDE FOR PROSPECTIVE STUDY SPONSORS (n.d.), http://www.nationalacademies.org/site_assets/
groups/nasite/documents/webpage/na_069619.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AR9-AUW8].
38. Id.
39. See Our Study Process, supra note 35; see also NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED.,
2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS 59 (2017) (showing 78% federal funding of the Academies’ studies
in 2017, the latest year available).
40. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., 2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS 59 (2017) (“Of
particular concern are recommendations calling for organizational changes or budgetary increases
within government agencies, for adoption of specific legislation . . . .”).
41. See Our Study Process, supra note 35.
42. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1, 4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (explaining
the requirements for diligent research and accuracy in the delivery of professional legal services).
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services”43 such as writing scholarly articles or National Academies
reports.
Something went off track in the Academies’ Report on return of
results. The three sponsoring agencies44 for the Report were NIH, the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS), which administers the Clinical Laboratory
Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA)45 regulations that promote
the safety of laboratory tests used in clinical care.46 The Report focuses
on questions raised by return of individual research results to people
participating in studies that involve analysis of biospecimens47 — in other
words, studies that include laboratory tests of people’s blood or tissue
samples.48
This Report deviates from the Academies’ own standards of quality,
restraint in legal recommendations, and respect for the rule of law. It is
full of legal content and makes multiple legal recommendations and thus
needed to meet the professional standards for legal analysis. Yet it makes
statements about federal law that prove false when subjected even to
cursory legal research.49 The SOT expressly instructs the committee not
to propose any amendments to the CLIA statute,50 yet the Report
recommends CLIA regulatory changes that appear unlawful unless
Congress amends the CLIA statute.51 A rudimentary requirement of legal
due diligence is to vet any proposed regulatory changes to make sure they
would not violate current statutes. However, there is no sign this vetting
occurred: some recommendations press agencies to take actions beyond
their statutory authority, while others awkwardly call for regulations to
be amended to do things the regulations already do.52 The Report even
presumes to advise one agency—the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services’ (HHS) Office for Civil Rights (OCR), which holds the
43. Id. at r. 5.7 (explaining professional responsibilities when delivering law-related
services).
44. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 2.
45. Pub. L. No. 100-578, 102 Stat. 2903 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 263a (2012)).
46. See 42 C.F.R. pt. 493 (2018).
47. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 7–8 (conceiving “research results” broadly as including
results of the research analysis, incidental or secondary findings, as well as raw data such as
genomic sequences generated during a study); id. at 8 (defining individual research results as
results that “are specific to one participant” as opposed—for example—to aggregate results that
describe a group of study participants).
48. See id. at 2, 7 (providing examples of research studies that are within the Report’s
scope).
49. See infra Parts III–V.
50. REPORT, supra note 10, at 9 (“[T]he committee was not asked to make recommendations
to Congress regarding changes to the CLIA law.”).
51. See infra notes 370–83 and accompanying text.
52. See infra Part V.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 5 [2019], Art. 5

1290

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

delegated authority53 to administer the HIPAA Privacy Rule54—to scale
back one of HIPAA’s core privacy protections,55 even though OCR was
not a study sponsor and the Report provides little evidence that OCR was
consulted.56
The Report “achieved consensus on a number of core issues”
including a claimed need to “transition away from firm rules, such as
those embodied in . . . the [HIPAA] regulations, that stipulate when
[laboratory test] results must or cannot be disclosed toward a processbased approach.”57 The “firm rules” in question include U.S. federal laws,
which the Report airily recommends our nation should “transition away
from.”58
Part I of this Article asks how this happened. We trace the core
problem to the Report’s SOT, which incorporated a disputed legal
position advanced by CMS, one of the agencies sponsoring the Report.
The SOT recited this position as if it were an established legal truth and
instructed the committee not to examine the CLIA statute59 (which, had
it been examined, proves otherwise). Working with sponsor-imposed
legal “blinders” on, the Report made two assumptions about federal law:
first, that the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s individual access right60 is in conflict
with the CLIA regulations,61 so that research laboratories will violate
CLIA if they comply with HIPAA62 and, second, that the CLIA
53. See Delegation of Authority to OCR to Implement/Enforce HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/
delegation-of-authority/index.html [https://perma.cc/SQ3X-8Y3P] (citing Statement of
Delegation of Authority, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,381 (Dec. 28, 2000)); see also Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 105(b), 122 Stat. 881, 905 (delegating
responsibility to implement GINA’s privacy mandate to HHS and, by implication, to OCR based
on the earlier subdelegation of HHS’s HIPAA responsibilities to OCR).
54. 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2018).
55. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 269–70 (calling on the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) to
revise its HIPAA regulations); discussion infra Section IV.B (discussing the impact of these
proposed changes).
56. See REPORT, supra note 10, app. at 279–87 (not mentioning OCR as a source of input);
id. app. at 289–94 (not listing OCR as having provided input during Public Sessions); id. app. at
311 n.106 (citing a conversation with a former OCR official who was no longer employed by the
agency at the time of writing, but citing no contact with currently serving OCR officials).
57. Id. at x.
58. Id.
59. See discussion infra Part I.
60. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2018) (providing an individual right to inspect and receive
copies of certain data stored by HIPAA-covered facilities).
61. 42 C.F.R. pt. 493.
62. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 1–2 (“Recent significant changes to federal regulations
have promoted transparency and allowed individuals greater access to their clinical and research
test results. These changes include the elimination of the laboratory exclusion from the [HIPAA]
privacy rule and revisions to the Common Rule that require prospective participants to be told
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regulations more broadly bar any reporting of individual-specific
research results by non-CLIA-certified research laboratories,63 including
established ethical practices such as the return of results and data from
research. This Article subjects these assumptions to the analysis that the
Academies’ committee was ordered not to provide. Neither assumption
withstands legal scrutiny.
Part II of this Article disentangles two concepts that the Report
improperly conflated. The first is privacy-related individual access rights,
such as those protected by the HIPAA Privacy Rule,64 the federal Privacy
Act,65 various state privacy laws,66 and the privacy laws of other
jurisdictions such as the European Union.67 The second is the return of
an individual’s research results as elaborated in the bioethics and
scientific literature and in consensus guidelines developed and widely
applied over the past twenty years.68 These concepts do have a superficial
during the consent process whether clinically relevant individual research results will be returned.
On the other hand, the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA) bars
laboratories that are not CLIA certified from reporting individual research results. This creates a
dilemma . . . .”); id. at 28 (referring to “[t]he current absolute prohibition of the return of results
from non-CLIA-certified laboratories”); id. at 250 tbl.6-2 (stating that a non-CLIA-certified
laboratory has a “[l]egal obligation[]” to make “[m]andatory disclosure under HIPAA (but act of
disclosure then requires laboratory to become CLIA certified”)—in other words, the required act
of providing access to data under HIPAA will trigger CLIA jurisdiction for laboratories that would
not otherwise be subject to the CLIA regulations). But see id. app. at 315 tbl.C-4 (including, in a
similar statement by the Committee’s legal consultant, an important proviso that this statement
was true “according to CMS”—a proviso that does not appear in the Report’s version of the table
at 250 tbl.6-2).
63. See id. at 28 (referring to “[t]he current absolute prohibition of the return of results from
non-CLIA-certified laboratories”).
64. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.524.
65. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896.
66. See, e.g., California Consumer Privacy Act, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3 (West) (“[I]t is the
intent of the Legislature to further Californians’ right to privacy by giving consumers an effective
way to control their personal information, by ensuring the following rights[, including] . . . [t]he
right of Californians to access their personal information.”); id. at 3–4 (amending Part 4 of
Division 3 of the Civil Code to add § 1798.100(d), which provides individuals with a right of
access to their data).
67. See, e.g., Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data
and on the Free Movement of Such Data and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, art. 15, 2016 O.J. (L
119) 1, 43.
68. See, e.g., NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 8 (presenting
recommendations from a presidential commission); Ebony B. Bookman et al., Reporting Genetic
Results in Research Studies: Summary and Recommendations of an NHLBI Working Group, 140
AM. J. MED. GENETICS PART A 1033, 1033 (2006) (presenting a set of consensus guidelines);
Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research: Analysis and
Recommendations, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 219, 219, 242 (2008) [hereinafter Wolf et al.,
Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research] (same); Timothy Caulfield et al.,
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similarity: both have the effect of placing individual test results and data
into research participants’ hands. This similarity invites authors—
including us at times69—to discuss the two in one breath. Here, however,
we stress that they are distinct concepts, with different legal histories and
rationales that the Academies’ Report failed to acknowledge. This
omission, we argue, contributed to a legally flawed set of
recommendations.
Part III supplies necessary background on the CLIA statute and
regulations—admittedly a dry topic but one that crucially affects research
participants’ privacy and ethical rights in research involving laboratory
testing. Part IV critiques CMS’s position regarding its jurisdiction to
regulate research laboratories under CLIA. Specifically, is the CMS
position a permissible interpretation of the CLIA regulations and does it
warrant deference? We conclude the answers are “no” and “no.” Part V
explains why the Report’s starting assumptions about HIPAA access and
the return of results were flawed and then explores how these erroneous
assumptions produced problematic recommendations.
What emerges is that the Academies’ Report proposes a sweeping
program of regulatory reforms to resolve a presumed regulatory conflict
that actually never existed. The Report proclaims support for the ideal of
greater participant access to results and data, while recommending
policies that would constrict and delay that access. This contradiction
may confuse readers on first exposure to this Report. However, careful
analysis requires going beyond the Report’s rhetoric to its actual
recommendations. The Report champions greater respect for people who
participate in research by calling them “research ‘participants,’ rather
than research ‘subjects,’”70 yet its recommendations fail to trust these
people by protecting their access to their own personal information. The
Research Ethics Recommendations for Whole-Genome Research: Consensus Statement, 6 PLOS
BIOLOGY 430, 432–33 (2008) (same); Richard R. Fabsitz et al., Ethical and Practical Guidelines
for Reporting Genetic Research Results to Study Participants: Updated Guidelines from a
National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute Working Group, 3 CIRCULATION CARDIOVASCULAR
GENETICS 574, 574 (2010) (same); Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings and
Research Results in Genomic Research Involving Biobanks and Archived Data Sets, 14 GENET.
MED. 361, 361, 363 (2012) [hereinafter Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings and Research
Results in Biobanks] (same); Gail P. Jarvik et al., Return of Genomic Results to Research
Participants: The Floor, the Ceiling, and the Choices in Between, 94 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 818,
818 (2014) (same); Susan M. Wolf et al., Returning a Research Participant’s Genomic Results to
Relatives: Analysis and Recommendations, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 440, 440 (2015) [hereinafter
Wolf et al., Returning Genomic Results to Relatives] (same).
69. See Susan M. Wolf & Barbara J. Evans, Return of Results and Data to Study
Participants, 362 SCI. 159, 160 (2018) [hereinafter Wolf & Evans, Return of Results]; Susan M.
Wolf & Barbara J. Evans, Defending the Return of Results and Data, 362 SCI. 1255, 1256 (2018)
[hereinafter Wolf & Evans, Defending Return of Results].
70. REPORT, supra note 10, at 269.
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Report urges stripping research participants of established privacy and
ethical rights.
The Academies’ Report on return of results struck a Faustian
bargain.71 It analyzed a problem under terms that traded away something
of supreme importance—the Academies’ 150-year tradition of
independence, objectivity, and high standards of technical quality72—and
doomed the Report’s legal and policy recommendations.
I. A TROUBLING STATEMENT OF TASK
The Report’s SOT states: “Currently, any research laboratory that
returns individual-specific research results is regulated by CLIA.”73 This
statement assigns controlling weight not to a statute or regulation, but
rather to a strange and highly controversial position CMS announced in
a lowly PDF file74 posted unsigned on its website on or about December
2014.75 According to this position, research laboratories cannot report
individual-specific results unless the results meet clinical standards of
quality76— which, according to the PDF file, means that the laboratory
must comply77 with CLIA. The Report wrongly characterizes this PDF
position as a CMS “interpretation” of the CLIA regulations,78 seemingly
unaware that “interpretation” is a legal term of art. Not every opinion or
position put forth by a federal agency is a permissible interpretation of

71. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
72. See Our Study Process, supra note 35.
73. REPORT, supra note 10, at 5 box S-2 (reciting the Report’s statement of task).
74. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Research Testing and Clinical Laboratory
Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA) Regulations, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA/Downloads/ResearchTesting-and-CLIA.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XBH-SUXP].
75. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA/index.
html?redirect=/CLIA/ [https://perma.cc/9ENV-ZNZL].
76. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 74.
77. This Article uses the term “CLIA-compliant” to refer, jointly, to two types of
laboratories: (1) laboratories that comply with CLIA by obtaining a CLIA certificate (CLIAcertified laboratories), and (2) laboratories that are CLIA-exempt as a result of being licensed by
a state whose laboratory requirements CMS has determined are equal to or more stringent than
CLIA’s requirements, and the state licensure program has been approved by CMS. Two states—
New York and Washington—currently meet those conditions. List of Exempt States Under the
Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA/Downloads/Exempt
StatesList.pdf [https://perma.cc/2G59-HW5G]. CLIA-exempt laboratories comply with CLIA by
complying with their relevant state-licensing requirements. See id.
78. REPORT, supra note 10, at 28 (“CMS’s interpretation of CLIA blocks any laboratory
from returning a test result if the laboratory is not CLIA certified . . . .”).
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the law. We explain how CMS’s position contradicts the clear79
jurisdictional language of the CLIA statute80 and is inconsistent with the
plain text of the CLIA regulations.81 Nevertheless, the SOT recites it as
an established legal truth.82
The Report admits that CMS’s position is legally controversial, but
credits it without any analysis.83 The SOT required this approach,
insisting that the committee “not provide any legal interpretation or
analysis regarding the scope or applicability of CLIA.”84 This barred the
committee from conducting elementary legal research—such as checking
what the relevant statute says—that would have readily revealed the error
in the SOT.85
The Report recounts how “[t]he sponsors indicated to the committee
that it would be appropriate to include in its description of the current
regulatory environment for the return of individual research results
CMS’s current interpretation of the scope and applicability of CLIA.”86
This was an instruction for the committee to take sides in a legal dispute
by describing a contested agency position about the law (the PDF
position) as if it really were the law. Accordingly, the Report, in places,
ceases to characterize CMS’s position as a disputed agency assertion and
instead repeats that position, in the committee’s own voice, as a firm
declaration of legal truth.87 Doing so lends the Academies’ reputation to
an unexamined and, it turns out, legally flawed assertion.
79. See Regulations Implementing the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of
1988 (CLIA), 57 Fed. Reg. 7002, 7011 (Feb. 28, 1992) (to be codified in scattered sections of 42
C.F.R.) (determining, in a notice and comment proceeding conducted by the Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA), which was the former name for the agency now known as
CMS, that “CLIA clearly defines the type of facility subject to regulation”).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a) (2012).
81. See discussion infra Parts III and IV; see also Sec’y’s Advisory Comm. on Human
Research Prots., Attachment C: Return of Individual Results and Special Consideration of Issues
Arising from Amendments of HIPAA and CLIA, HHS.GOV, www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sachrp-committee/
recommendations/2015-september-28-attachment-c/index.html [https://perma.cc/KJ26-CL5C]
(finding the CMS position “at odds with the plain language of the [CLIA] regulation”).
82. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993) (“As we have often stated, provided
an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations does not violate the Constitution or a federal
statute, it must be given ‘controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.’” (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945))); see also
1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.4 (5th ed. 2010) (“Stinson is
consistent with many opinions issued both before and after Stinson.”).
83. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 9 (noting that legal scholars question this interpretation).
84. Id. at 7 box S-2 (quoting the statement of task).
85. Id. at 9 (“[T]he committee was advised that making any comments, analysis, or
conclusions regarding the appropriateness of that [CMS] interpretation would be beyond what
was intended in the Statement of Task.”).
86. Id.
87. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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The Report’s SOT is the legal equivalent of having a sponsor instruct
the Academies to conduct a scientific study that assumes Π=6 (instead of
3.14159265359 . . .),88 and without asking any questions. It might be
appropriate in some circumstances for a study to examine a
counterfactual hypothetical, if it is consistently described as a
hypothetical. For example, a report by the Academies could conceivably
state:
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) is planning a mission to a distant galaxy where
circles are not round and the usual laws of physics do not
hold. Accordingly, NASA has engaged the Academies to
advise NASA how to operate in an environment where Π=6.
The Academies have agreed to perform this study but take
no position on whether Π=6.
It is a different matter for study sponsors to instruct a committee of
the Academies to “include in its description” of the truth a federal
agency’s disputed version of the truth, without “making any comments,
analysis, or conclusions regarding the appropriateness of that
interpretation.”89 That is what the Academies agreed to do in this Report.
For the Academies to agree to include an agency’s disputed views in
the Academies’ own “description of the current regulatory
environment,”90 with no fact-checking, makes the Academies a captive
mouthpiece for a federal agency under fire. Seemingly, all an embattled
agency would need to do in order to advance its version of disputed law
or facts would be to enter into a contract with the Academies and set
ground rules requiring a report to treat the agency’s side of the dispute as
reality. An agency could, for example, instruct the Academies to publish
a report that “include[s] in its description”91 that climate change is not
real, that smoking does not cause cancer, that nobody in America suffers
from hunger or substandard health care, that endangered species are
thriving, or that the First Amendment does not protect the freedom of
religion. These may seem far-fetched fodder for future Academies
reports, but that reaction underscores the importance of scrutinizing the
terms an agency imposes. Accepting agency positions and writing them
into a committee’s consensus report risks allowing the Academies’
88. See Sarah Jacobsson Purewal, A Brief History of Pi, PCWORLD (Mar. 13, 2013, 3:28
PM), https://www.pcworld.com/article/191389/a-brief-history-of-pi.html [https://perma.cc/
F88A-47CA] (explaining that Pi, also denoted Π, is the ratio of a circle’s circumference to its
diameter).
89. REPORT, supra note 10, at 9.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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reputation for rigor and independence to be diluted and used to advance
contested agency agendas. The potential for mischief is real, especially
in an age pundits have christened the “post-truth era.”92
The Academies’ agreement to conduct a study on these terms is
concerning, as is the fact that this study proceeded to completion under
these strictures. The Academies have procedures in place to correct an
SOT that a committee, once it starts work, determines is inadequate.93
Still, the portrait that emerges here is of a sincere and hard-working
committee saddled with a deeply troubling SOT. Going forward, the
Academies should be very reluctant to bind a committee to a sponsoring
agency’s account of the law, especially when that account is mired in
known controversy.94 The Academies’ well-earned reputation for
rigorous analysis should extend to its legal analysis, not just medicine and
science.
II. DISTINGUISHING HIPAA DATA ACCESS FROM THE
RETURN OF RESULTS
Privacy-related individual access rights, such as the rights central to
the HIPAA Privacy Rule,95 arguably were beyond the scope of the
Academies’ Report. The Report’s stated subject matter, as indicated in its
title, was the return of individual research results. The Report dragged
HIPAA’s access right into its scope by accepting CMS’s position that
CLIA prohibits the return of results from non-CLIA-certified research
laboratories; this seems to imply that CLIA also prohibits HIPAA
access.96 The reality is more complicated. HIPAA’s access right differs
from the return of results in terms of its history and legal basis, its
rationale and purposes, the scope of data disclosure to fulfill those
purposes, its administration and enforceability, and the customs and
92. See, e.g., Chris Hayes, Chris Hayes Reviews Michiko Kakutani’s Book about our PostTruth Era, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/18/books/review/
michiko-kakutani-death-of-truth.html [https://perma.cc/GN9X-MDA3].
93. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE
PROCESS 5 (2005), http://www.nationalacademies.org/site_assets/groups/nasite/documents/web
page/na_069620.pdf [https://perma.cc/JMN2-8WA6] (“The charge to the committee—developed
before committee members are selected—is the formal statement of the questions to be addressed
by the study. This statement defines the study’s scope and issues to be examined. If a committee
finds in the course of its work that this description is inadequate, the charge can be formally
modified through petition to the Executive Committee of the National Research Council’s
Governing Board.”).
94. REPORT, supra note 10, at 9 (noting that there was legal controversy).
95. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2018) (providing individuals a right of access to certain
information about themselves stored at HIPAA-covered facilities).
96. See REPORT supra note 10, at 28; see infra this Part (discussing the breadth of access
under HIPAA’s access right).
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practices surrounding it. By blurring two very different concepts, the
Report overreached into subject matter—data privacy law—for which its
committee membership was not constituted and which lay outside the
jurisdiction of the three agencies sponsoring the Report. This Part
highlights key differences between the two concepts.
A. Return of Results: History, Purpose, and Scope
The practice of returning individual research results and incidental or
secondary findings97 grew out of ethical and pragmatic concerns
elaborated in the bioethics and scientific literature for decades and in
consensus guidelines over the past twenty years.98 Beginning in 1999,
consensus recommendations have urged researchers to offer some
individual-specific findings to research participants.99 Most of these
recommendations are based on ethical concepts including respect for
autonomy, reciprocity, a limited duty of “ancillary care,” and an ethical
duty to warn.100 No statute or regulation expressly commands return of
these findings, but commentators have argued that the federal regulations

97. Incidental or secondary findings are generally understood as findings from research that
have potential clinical or reproductive relevance to the individual but are beyond the scope of the
research aims. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research, supra
note 68, at 219. Secondary findings may be deliberately sought, while incidental findings typically
are not. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, ANTICIPATE AND
COMMUNICATE: ETHICAL MANAGEMENT OF INCIDENTAL AND SECONDARY FINDINGS IN THE
CLINICAL, RESEARCH, AND DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER CONTEXTS 25–28 (2013), https://bioethics
archive.georgetown.edu/pcsbi/sites/default/files/FINALAnticipateCommunicate_PCSBI_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5J6A-S3DC]. Some commentators use the two terms interchangeably. See
Medically Actionable Secondary or Incidental Results, CSER, https://www.ashg.org/education/
csertoolkit/medicallyactionable.html [https://perma.cc/7F5P-8RGM].
98. See, e.g., NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 8; Reilly, supra note 7;
sources cited supra note 68 (citing additional guidelines).
99. See sources cited supra note 68.
100. For discussion of the ethical bases of return of research results and incidental or
secondary findings, see, for example, Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human
Subjects Research, supra note 68, at 227–33 and Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings and
Research Results in Biobanks, supra note 68, at 367–69. The Academies’ Report includes an
Appendix D addressing the ethical bases for return of results. REPORT, supra note 10, app. at 339–
56. Unfortunately, the Appendix evaluates that literature by asking whether it supports claims that
the literature does not actually aim to support. For example, the Appendix says, “the focus here is
limited to a narrow, fundamental question: When, if ever, is returning results . . . morally
imperative for all human subjects research . . . ?” Id. app. at 340. However, the literature on return
of results and incidental or secondary findings generally focuses on when results should, may, or
should not be returned––not on whether they must be returned, much less across all human
subjects research. See, e.g., Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects
Research, supra note 68, at 219–20; Fabsitz et al., supra note 68; Wolf et al., Returning Genomic
Results to Relatives, supra note 68.
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governing research with human participants articulate relevant duties.101
These include the duty to describe all expected risks and benefits in
eliciting consent and the duty to include in the consent form, if required
by the IRB, “a ‘statement that significant new findings developed during
the course of research which may relate to the subject’s willingness to
continue participation will be provided to the subject.’”102 While health
care professionals providing clinical care may have common law duties
to recognize and communicate incidental findings of health significance
and have been sued for failure to do so, the potential liability of
researchers is less clear.103 Research records may contain detailed
information about participants, including genome sequencing104 or
imaging results,105 giving rise to an ethical106 and possibly even a
common law duty107 to warn participants of findings that suggest a need
for follow-up clinical testing and evaluation.
There is ongoing debate about how much of the information generated
by research ought to be returned. A number of consensus
recommendations distinguish findings that should be offered to
participants, those that may be offered in the researcher’s discretion, and
101. See, e.g., Susan M. Wolf et al., The Law of Incidental Findings in Human Subjects
Research: Establishing Researchers’ Duties, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 361, 366 (2008); Wolf et al.,
Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research, supra note 68, at 227.
102. See Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings and Research Results in Biobanks, supra
note 68, at 227–28 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2007); and also quoting 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(b)(5)
(2007)). These provisions remain operative.
103. See Ellen Wright Clayton & Amy L. McGuire, The Legal Risks of Returning Results of
Genomics Research, 14 GENETICS MED. 473, 475 (2012); Elizabeth R. Pike et al., Finding Fault?
Exploring Legal Duties to Return Incidental Findings in Genomic Research, 102 GEO. L.J. 795,
795 (2014); Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings and Research Results in Biobanks, supra
note 68, at 219; Wolf et al., supra note 101, at 362; Susan M. Wolf, The Role of Law in the Debate
over Return of Research Results and Incidental Findings: The Challenge of Developing Law for
Translational Science, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 435, 435–37 (2012) [hereinafter Wolf, The
Role of Law].
104. See Jarvik et al., supra note 68, at 818 (discussing research use of genome sequencing).
105. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Human
Research Protections (SACHRP Day 2), NIH.GOV (May 26, 2017, 8:30 AM),
https://videocast.nih.gov/PastEvents.asp?c=111 [https://perma.cc/6LVP-K5W7] (noting the
potential for X-rays and MRIs to produce incidental findings during research).
106. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 60–61 (noting that “it might be argued that the research
team has a ‘duty to warn’ or ‘duty to rescue’ the participant as he or she is in a position to prevent
serious harm at little or no personal cost and the participant might otherwise not discover the
condition in time,” and commenting that these duties “were originally legal concepts . . . and they
are now also seen as referring to an ethical obligation” (footnotes omitted)); see also sources cited
supra note 103.
107. See, e.g., Wolf, The Role of Law, supra note 103, at 435–37 (noting concerns about
potential liability for failure to return results); Clayton & McGuire, supra note 103, at 475 (noting
concerns, despite the absence of statutory duties to return research results and a lack of lawsuits
to date that found a tort duty to return such results).
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those that should not be offered.108 Some commentators confine the first
category to results with analytic validity and clinical significance, such
as laboratory test results having analytic validity,109 clinical validity,110
and clinical utility111 or actionability.112 This view implicitly grounds
“should return” in a duty to warn.
Commentators have long recognized that researchers “may return”—
in other words, it is ethically permissible for them to return—a broader
set of research findings, even when the clinical significance is unclear.113
The information in question could include test results that warrant further
evaluation such as genetic results that require further clinical evaluation
or environmental exposure results whose clinical meaning is not yet well
understood. Researchers may also offer findings that may be of
reproductive or personal importance, such as the participant’s genetic
carrier status or genetic risks (such as risk of developing Alzheimer’s
disease) even if there is no efficacious treatment currently available. This
view treats the return of information as serving broader health, dignitary,
and pragmatic purposes beyond a mere duty to warn of clear danger—for
example, displaying respect for participants’ autonomy and agency over
108. See, e.g., Wolf et al., Managing Incidental in Human Subjects Research, supra note 68,
at 235 tbl.5; Fabsitz et al., supra note 68, at 576; Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings and
Research Results in Biobanks, supra note 68, at 372 tbl.4; Jarvik et al., supra note 68, at 823.
109. See SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETIC TESTING, ENHANCING THE OVERSIGHT OF
GENETIC TESTS: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SACGT 15 (2000) (defining analytical validity as
how accurately and consistently a test measures the property or characteristic it is intended to
measure).
110. Id. at 15 n.11 (defining “clinical validity” as how well the test results correlate to the
presence or absence of a clinical condition or predisposition).
111. Id. at 15 n.12 (defining “clinical utility” in terms of whether a test provides information
that has value in identifying effective treatment or preventive strategies).
112. See Fabsitz et al., supra note 68, at 575 (“Actionable means that disclosure has the
potential to lead to an improved health outcome; there must be established therapeutic or
preventive interventions available or other available actions that may change the course of the
disease.”).
113. See, e.g., Ingrid A. Holm & Patrick L. Taylor, The Informed Cohort Oversight Board:
From Values to Architecture, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 669, 676 (2012) (supporting disclosure
of information even if its clinical significance is uncertain but requiring that it be analytically
valid); Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings and Research Results in Biobanks, supra note
68, at 231 (noting that some definitions of “clinical utility” focus narrowly on health outcomes
while others recognize utility if results are important to the individuals and families involved);
Sec’y’s Advisory Comm. on Human Research Prots., Attachment B: Return of Individual
Research Results, HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sachrp-committee/recommendations/
attachment-b-return-individual-research-results/index.html [https://perma.cc/2X73-M5Z4] (last
reviewed July 21, 2016) (defining “individual research results” broadly to include information
that may have no clinical or reproductive significance) (“SACHRP would like to stress that the
individual results do not have to be of clinical value to the subjects in order for return to be
considered. Even if the results are not clinically relevant, the pure intellectual curiosity of the
subjects is sufficient reason to return the results absent other reasons not to return them.”).
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information that pertain to them, or enhancing their engagement with the
research.
The literature on return of results and incidental or secondary findings
has also increasingly acknowledged the importance of recognizing
participants’ right to receive their own raw data.114 This may enable
participants to follow future progress in understanding data whose
meaning is currently unclear. Access can also empower participants to
contribute their data to other studies, initiate research studies in
partnership with others, and form social networks with similar
individuals.115 Surveys show that participants value the return of results
and data even when the information is uncertain or lacks clinical
significance.116
B. Privacy-Related Individual Access Rights: History, Purpose,
and Scope
The HIPAA access right has a distinct history, purpose, and scope.
The HIPAA Privacy Rule,117 since it was first finalized in December
2000,118 has always contained an individual access right.119 This is a
legally enforceable civil right—specifically, a privacy right—created by
federal regulations. Before 2014, however, this right could not be
114. See, e.g., Barbara J. Evans et al., Regulatory Changes Raise Troubling Questions for
Genomic Testing, 16 GENET. MED. 799, 799–803 (2014) (discussing the individual right of access
to one’s own data and implications for return of results); Jeantine E. Lunshof et al., Raw Personal
Data: Providing Access, 343 SCI. 373, 373 (2014) (“The possibility for research participants to
access their raw data is a basic requirement for a just and reciprocal relationship . . . .”); Adrian
Thorogood et al., APPLaUD: Access for Patients and Participants to Individual Level
Uninterpreted Genomic Data, HUM. GENOMICS (2018), https://humgenomics.biomedcentral.com/
track/pdf/10.1186/s40246-018-0139-5 [https://perma.cc/37NV-D6FQ] (supporting “a default
right of participants to access their own individual-level genomic data upon request”).
115. Wolf & Evans, Return, supra note 69, at 159.
116. See, e.g., Lisa S. Parker, Returning Individual Research Results: What Role Should
People’s Preferences Play?, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 449, 456 (2012) (“What appears rather
consistent across most of these studies is the finding that a substantial proportion of people express
a desire for receiving research results.”) and see Juli Bollinger et al., Public Preferences
Regarding the Return of Individual Genetic Research Results: Findings from a Qualitative Focus
Group Study, 14 GENET. MED. 451 (2012) (articulating the interests served by individual access
to results and data); Adrian Thorogood et al., APPLaUD: Access for Patients and Participants to
Individual Level Uninterpreted Genomic Data, 12 HUM. GENOM. 7 (2018) (articulating the same);
Jennifer L. Ohayon et al., Researcher and Institutional Review Board Perspectives on the Benefits
and Challenges of Reporting Back Biomonitoring and Environmental Exposure Results, 153
ENVIRON. RES. 140 (2017) (articulating the same).
117. 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2018).
118. See generally Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65
Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (promulgating
the HIPAA Privacy Rule and including the access right at 45 C.F.R. § 164.524).
119. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524.
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exercised at HIPAA-covered laboratories in all fifty states, because some
states had laws limiting individuals’ direct access to laboratory test
results, and the federal HIPAA and CLIA regulations were deferring to
those state-imposed restrictions.120 On February 6, 2014, CMS joined
OCR in promulgating a final rule121 preempting state laws that limit
people’s ability to exercise their access rights at HIPAA-covered
laboratories.122 This made all HIPAA-covered laboratories subject to the
access right.
The Academies’ Report never discussed the history of privacy-related
access rights. This omission left a false impression that HIPAA’s access
right is some sort of recent innovation, an isolated aberration. To the
contrary, HIPAA’s access right rests on a fifty-year history of federal
privacy laws that treat individual access to one’s own data as a fair
information practice and a core element of data privacy protections.123
Indeed, the importance of individual access to data held by others is so
120. See Barbara J. Evans, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act at Age 10:
GINA’s Controversial Assertion that Data Transparency Protects Privacy and Civil Rights, 60
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2017, 2067–68 (2019) (providing a detailed review of the relevant
government documents and advisory reports, and tracing the regulatory history of these
restrictions).
121. CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 7290, 7290 (Feb. 6, 2014) (to
be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 493, 45 C.F.R. pt. 164).
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 84 Stat. 1128 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012)) (authorizing the collection and storage of people’s
financial and credit data without their consent to facilitate a well-functioning credit market and,
in return, granting individuals specific civil rights including a right of access to their data); see
also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, PUB. NO. (OS) 73-94, REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS: RECORDS,
COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS xx (1973) (announcing an influential Code of Fair
Information Practices (FIPs) based on five principles, one of which is that “[t]here must be a way
for an individual to find out what information about him is in a record and how it is used”); Fred
H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE
AGE OF THE ‘INFORMATION ECONOMY’ 343, 345–46 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006) (tracing subsequent
development of FIPs, including access rights, after the 1973 HEW Code of FIPs); Privacy Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a), (d)
(2012)) (providing an individual right of access to data held in governmental databases, including
governmentally held Medicare data); PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM’N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN
INFORMATION SOCIETY 67 (1977) (treating individual access rights as a core privacy protection in
a Privacy Act-commissioned report that heavily influenced the subsequent development of the
HIPAA Privacy Rule); U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Confidentiality of Individually
Identifiable Health Information: Recommendations of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, Pursuant to Section 264 of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (Sept. 11, 1997), https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/confidentiality-individually-identifiablehealth-information [https://perma.cc/2V9X-XFAV] [hereinafter HHS, HIPAA Recommendations]
(citing the Privacy Protection Study Commission’s Report and calling for individual access rights
in the report to Congress that set the roadmap for the HIPAA Privacy Rule).
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well established, that many states have recognized the same right in
various contexts.124
At the federal level, the Privacy Act of 1974 includes a congressional
finding that data privacy is a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution125 and it describes an individual right to inspect and obtain
one’s own data as necessary and proper to protect this privacy right.126
These are enacted congressional findings of fact—not just flowery words
Congress put in front of the legislation, but an actual part of the legislation
itself, passed by both houses of Congress, signed into law by President
Ford, and recorded as statutes in the U.S. Code.127 The Privacy Act
expresses Congress’s conviction that access enables the exercise of
fundamental Constitutional rights.
The Privacy Act provides privacy protections (including an access
right) only for data held in governmental databases—for example,
federally held Medicare data—but it commissioned a Privacy Protection
Study Commission (PPSC) to recommend protections for data in privatesector environments.128 HIPAA’s access right flows from these PPSC
recommendations published in 1977.129 The 1996 HIPAA statute130
required HHS, by 1997, to prepare a report for Congress on federal health
privacy protections.131 This 1997 HHS report132 cited and incorporated
124. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 13.04(3) (2018); Assemb. B. No. 375, 2018 Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2018).
125. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a note (2012) (“The Congress finds that . . . [t]he right to privacy is
a personal and fundamental right protected by the Constitution of the United States[,] and . . . it
is necessary and proper for the Congress to regulate the collection, maintenance, use, and
dissemination of information . . . .”).
126. Id. (including, as a core element of data privacy protection, safeguards that “permit an
individual to gain access to information pertaining to him . . . to have a copy made of all or any
portion thereof, and to correct or amend such records”).
127. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 129 (2008) (pointing out that Congressional findings of fact can include
facts about the law); William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional Fact-Finding in RightsEnforcing and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878, 881–82 (2013) (discussing
enacted Congressional findings of legal fact, such as the ones in the Privacy Act, and noting that
while such findings are not, strictly speaking, binding on the courts, courts do give some weight
to them and tend to give more weight to congressional findings that expand individual rights, as
the Privacy Act findings do, than to those that reduce people’s rights).
128. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a), (d).
129. See generally PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM’N, supra note 123 (providing a set of
recommendations, commissioned by Congress, for protecting individuals’ data privacy in the
post-1970s information economy).
130. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.
(2012)).
131. Id. § 264(b).
132. See HHS, HIPAA Recommendations, supra note 123.
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the PPSC’s 1977 recommendations in its roadmap for the HIPAA Privacy
Rule.
The Academies’ Report enumerates the many purposes that return of
individual research results serves,133 but omits any discussion of the wellarticulated legislative and regulatory purposes served by privacy-related
access rights, so we briefly fill this gap here. Return of results and
privacy-related access exhibit some overlapping purposes—for example,
both display respect for participants’ autonomy and both empower people
to form social networks and contribute their data to other research
studies—but their foundational purposes are distinct. As noted in the
Academies’ Report, the return of results initially grew out of a perceived
ethical duty to warn participants when research detects a potential health
risk that the participant might otherwise have no way to know.134
In contrast, HIPAA’s access right serves privacy-enabling purposes.
These were first articulated in the PPSC’s 1977 report and in the 1997
HHS recommendations to Congress.135 HHS, OCR, and CMS further
elaborated the purposes of HIPAA’s access right in the preambles to
proposed and final rules creating or expanding that right.136 Readers are
referred elsewhere for a detailed discussion of these sources.137 To
summarize, the foundational purpose of HIPAA’s access right is to
enhance individual privacy protections. Unless people can see the
information being stored about them, they cannot assess how much
privacy risk the information may pose.138 Are the data embarrassing? Is
their storage or circulation a source of concern? Are the data even
accurate? Might the data contribute to identity theft? Could the data be
used to re-identify the individual? Do the data include elements that
might implicate them or a loved one in a crime, as recently happened in
the case of the Golden State Killer?139 People can suffer discrimination
or stigmatization based on inaccurate data that have been wrongly
133. See generally REPORT, supra note 10, at 59–92 (discussing the return of individual
research results).
134. See id. at 60–61.
135. See PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM’N, supra note 123, at 3; HHS, HIPAA
Recommendations, supra note 123.
136. See Evans, supra note 120, at 2055 (providing a detailed review of the relevant
government documents and advisory reports).
137. Id. at 2056–57.
138. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg.
59,918, 59,980 (proposed Nov. 3, 1999) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (noting, in the
preamble to the proposed Privacy Rule, that the right to inspect and copy one’s data “is a
fundamental aspect of protecting privacy”).
139. See Gina Kolata & Heather Murphy, The Golden State Killer is Tracked Through a
Thicket of DNA, and Experts Shudder, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/04/27/health/dna-privacy-golden-state-killer-genealogy.html [https://perma.cc/YUY9-4H4W].
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attributed to them and, without access, a person has little chance of ever
detecting and correcting such errors.
Another foundational purpose of privacy-related access rights is to
enable people to give valid, informed consent for secondary use of their
stored data. In its 1997 privacy recommendations to Congress,140 HHS
stressed that the “decision whether to disclose a record may depend on
what the record says, and so access to the record is integral to making an
informed choice to disclose [information].”141 In this respect, the Privacy
Rule holds informed consent to a higher ethical standard than does the
Common Rule,142 a major federal research regulation. The Privacy Rule
regards people’s authorizations for secondary uses of their stored data as
ill-informed, unless they have a way to inspect the data they are being
asked to share.143 This concept strikes some people as odd, yet it has
considerable merit: When consenting to a third-party use of one’s data,
being “informed” does not merely mean knowing how the data will be
used; it also means knowing precisely what sort of data one is being asked
to release to the third party.
The HIPAA Privacy Rule creates a right for individuals to inspect and
make copies of all of the data about themselves that a HIPAA-covered
entity (such as a hospital, clinic, or HIPAA-regulated laboratory) has
stored in each person’s designated record set (DRS).144 This right is
subject only to a few narrow exceptions.145 The “designated record set”
is the legal term of art denoting the HIPAA-accessible records about an
individual stored at a particular HIPAA-covered facility.146 The DRS
140. See HHS, HIPAA Recommendations, supra note 123.
141. Id.
142. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 46, subpart A.
143. Cf. id. (providing no individual right of access to one’s own data under the Common
Rule). Revisions to the Common Rule that went into effect on January 21, 2019 exacerbate this
problem by allowing for “broad consent” to secondary uses, so that individuals may not know the
content of their dataset released for secondary uses or the uses to which those data will be put. 45
C.F.R. § 46.116(a), (d) (allowing broad consent to be obtained in lieu of traditional informed
consent).
144. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)
145. Id.
146. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (“Designated record set means: (1) A group of records
maintained by or for a covered entity that is: (i) The medical records and billing records about
individuals maintained by or for a covered health care provider; (ii) The enrollment, payment,
claims adjudication, and case or medical management record systems maintained by or for a
health plan; or (iii) Used, in whole or in part, by or for the covered entity to make decisions about
individuals.”); see also id. § 160.103 (treating genetic information as health information for
purposes of the Privacy Rule); id. § 164.501 (“[T]he term record means any item, collection, or
grouping of information that includes protected health information and is maintained, collected,
used, or disseminated by or for a covered entity.”). The content of a person’s DRS may vary from
one HIPAA-covered entity to the next; for example, the person’s primary care physician may have

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol71/iss5/5

24

Evans and Wolf: A Faustian Bargain that Undermines Research Participants’ Privacy

2019]

A FAUSTIAN BARGAIN

1305

includes all records “[u]sed, in whole or in part . . . to make decisions
about individuals.”147 HHS has clarified that this encompasses nonmedical as well as medical decision-making and information of a type
that the facility uses to make decisions about any individuals, even if that
information was not so used when making decisions about the person
requesting the data.148
A person’s DRS is not restricted to information that has clinical
significance. In ordinary health-care contexts, for example, the DRS will
include a wide range of information, including unverified, speculative
doctors’ notes in patients’ charts.149 People have a legitimate privacy
interest in being able to inspect any information ascribed to them,
regardless of its reliability or clinical significance. Uncertain and
misattributed data that lack any clinical significance can nevertheless
place people’s privacy at risk and subject them to stigma and
discrimination. Accordingly, the DRS for laboratory data “includes not
only the laboratory test reports but also the underlying information
generated as part of the test, as well as other information concerning tests
a laboratory runs on an individual.”150 For genomic tests, the DRS could
include “the completed test report, the full gene variant information
generated by the test, as well as any other information in the designated
record set concerning the test.”151
The scope of the HIPAA-accessible DRS is considerably broader than
the traditional, more restrictive view of return of results and incidental or
secondary findings in service of a duty to warn. It is not, however, all that
different from the emerging, broader ethical view of return of results and
data in service of values such as respect for research participants’
autonomy and agency over their data.152
different records on file than does a hospital or laboratory with which the person has done
business. The person’s DRS, at a given HIPAA-covered facility, consists of records that that
facility maintains about the individual, so long as the records fall within the definition of
“designated record set.”
147. Id. § 164.501.
148. See Evans et al., supra note 114, at 800 (relying on guidance HHS provided in the
preamble to the rulemaking that initially implemented HIPAA’s access right at 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.524).
149. Individuals’ Right under HIPAA to Access their Health Information 45 CFR § 164.524,
HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/access/index.html
[https://perma.cc/9S7L-3QEP] (last updated Feb. 25, 2016).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See supra Section III.A; see also Susan M. Wolf, Return of Individual Research Results
and Incidental Findings: Facing the Challenges of Translational Science, ANNU. REV. GENOM.
HUM. GENET. 557, 561, 573 (2013) (“Return of results is the next frontier in the challenge of
treating those people whose data and specimens make research possible as . . . . indispensable
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Many, though not all, research facilities are subject to the HIPAA
Privacy Rule.153 Their research records are subject to HIPAA’s access
right on the same basis that clinical records are—that is, if they fit within
the definition of the DRS.154 Precisely because HIPAA access includes
access to research records, the Privacy Rule has always had an access
exception letting research facilities suspend research participants’ access
rights temporarily during clinical trials.155 Otherwise, research
participants could access their research data while a clinical trial is
ongoing and “un-blind” a trial whose validity requires “blinding” during
data collection.156 This exception allows research data to be withheld only
if the individual agreed to the temporary denial of access when
consenting to the research,157 and access must be reinstated upon
completion of the clinical trial.158 This exception proves the rule, which
is that research results and data held by HIPAA-covered facilities are
subject to HIPAA’s access right.
C. Differences in Administration, Customs, and Practices
A number of customs, practices, and guidelines have developed for
return of results and data. They are worth noting because they further
distinguish this domain from the domain of privacy-related access rights.
As a practical matter, the return of results and data can be initiated by
either party—either because an investigator or research institution
develops a policy or practice of offering return, or when research
participants ask questions. Researchers and their institutions have
considerable discretion over whether and how they choose to return
results.159 In contrast, HIPAA access is provided at the request of the

partners in the research enterprise and people with a real stake in learning individual findings of
significance.”).
153. See Evans et al., supra note 114, at 801 (explaining situations in which research
laboratories may become HIPAA-covered entities).
154. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2018) (providing the definition of a DRS).
155. See id. § 164.524(a)(2)(iii); see also Individuals’ Right under HIPAA to Access their
Health Information 45 CFR § 164.524, supra note 149 (summarizing this exception as allowing
access to be delayed if the requested information is “in a designated record set that is part of a
research study that includes treatment (e.g., clinical trial) and is still in progress, provided the
individual agreed to the temporary suspension of access when consenting to participate in the
research”).
156. An example would be a placebo-controlled randomized clinical trial, in which
participants learning during data collection whether they are in the placebo arm of the trial could
invalidate the results.
157. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(2)(iii).
158. Id.
159. See discussion supra Section II.A (noting, for example, that there is a category of results
that “may” be returned, which leaves decisions to the investigator’s or institution’s discretion).
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individual. With only limited exceptions,160 HIPAA-covered entities
must provide prompt access upon request.161 Failing to do so can lead to
administrative sanctions and civil penalties.162
Ethics review bodies such as Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) play
an important oversight role in return of results and data and IRB, or
dedicated return-of-results committees, may be involved in establishing
policies.163 In contrast, the Privacy Rule does not subject HIPAA
access—or any of HIPAA’s other privacy protections—to review or
approval by an IRB. IRBs play no role in administering the HIPAA
Privacy Rule, except that the Rule does grant covered entities the option
of using their IRBs, instead of a special-purpose HIPAA privacy board,
to approve waivers of individual authorization for research uses of
data.164 Other than that, the legal protections of the HIPAA Privacy Rule
are administered by a federal agency, the OCR, rather than by
institutional committees. The Privacy Rule creates federally protected
civil rights and does not authorize committees to second-guess or
interfere with them.
The ethical conduct of return of results is widely perceived to include
a responsibility to provide interpretive assistance (for example, genetic
counseling) to help participants make sense of the information they
receive and understand recommended next steps such as clinical
consultation.165 These responsibilities may contribute to the Report’s
perception that returning results and data “necessarily requires the
diversion of some research resources from the primary goal of the
research.”166 In contrast, HIPAA access does not involve interpretive
assistance, advice, or counseling. It is a “what’s on file is what you get”
right.167 This flows from the fact that privacy-related access rights are
160. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.524(a)(2), (3) (enumerating non-reviewable and reviewable
grounds for denial of access).
161. See id. § 164.524(b)(2) (providing for access within 30 days, with up to one thirty-day
extension possible if the covered entity provides a written explanation).
162. See Sebelius v. Uplift Med., PC, No. RWT 11CV2168, 2012 WL 8251345, at *1, *4
(D. Md. Aug. 30, 2012) (enforcing civil fines of $4.3 million for denial of timely HIPAA access
by forty-one patients, or approximately $100,000 per denied patient).
163. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 152, at 558.
164. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i).
165. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 195 (discussing the importance of communications with
persons receiving return of results and providing examples of some of the practices that
researchers and institutions have followed).
166. Id. at 59.
167. See CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 7290, 7293 (Feb. 6, 2014)
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 493, 45 C.F.R. pt. 164) (“Finally, we clarify that this final rule
does not require that laboratories interpret test results for patients. Patients merely have the right
to inspect and receive a copy of their completed test reports and other individually identifiable
health information maintained in a designated record set by a HIPAA-covered laboratory.”).
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tools for managing privacy risks rather than health risks. The goal is to
reveal what is on file, not what it means. Data holders can charge a very
restricted cost-based fee to cover some of the costs of access—such as
mailing and copying costs.168 The Privacy Rule allows data holders at
their discretion to provide explanations and interpretive assistance under
separate arrangements, if the recipient requests such help and agrees to
pay the fee, if any, for such services.169 HIPAA requires data holders to
provide information in the DRS, but does not require them to provide
advisory services.170
III. THE SCOPE OF CMS’S JURISDICTION TO REGULATE RESEARCH
LABORATORIES
The Academies’ Report opens with an assertion that HIPAA’s access
right171 is in conflict with the CLIA regulations172 and repeats this
assertion throughout the document.173 By doing so, the Report embraces
a dubious position CMS asserted in its 2014 PDF file: that non-CLIA
research laboratories reporting individual-specific results violate the
CLIA regulations.174 The PDF file pays no attention to why the laboratory
is reporting the results: Is it reporting them for use in the individual’s
clinical care, or to warn a participant to seek follow-up testing and clinical
evaluation of a secondary finding from research, or to comply with
HIPAA’s access requirement? According to the PDF position, it makes
no difference; the mere act of providing the information triggers
jurisdiction under the CLIA regulations.175
The Report characterizes CMS’s PDF file as an “interpretation” of the
CLIA regulations—that is, as an interpretative rule176 or general policy
168. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(c)(4).
169. Id.; see also id. § 164.524(c)(3)(ii).
170. See CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 7293.
171. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524.
172. See 42 C.F.R. pt. 493; see also REPORT, supra note 10, at 2 (saying that recent changes
to the HIPAA Privacy Rule expanded individuals’ access to their clinical and research test results,
but that CLIA “bars laboratories that are not CLIA certified from reporting individual research
results,” creating a “dilemma”).
173. See sources cited supra note 62.
174. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 74.
175. See discussion infra Sections IV.B, IV.C.
176. See Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1946)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) (providing an exception, at 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b)(3)(A), to the APA’s notice-and-comment requirement when agencies issue
“[interpretive] rules, general statements of policy, rules of agency organization, procedure, or
practice,” which scholars refer to collectively as non-legislative rules). This exception applies
unless another statute, such as the agency’s enabling statute, provides otherwise. 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b)(3).
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statement177 (together, “guidance document”178). The Report seems
unaware of the legal implications of characterizing the position stated in
the PDF file as an “interpretation.” This characterization, if it were
correct, would have important legal consequences. First, it would bear on
whether issuing the PDF file was even lawful. Guidance documents do
not require notice-and-comment rulemaking179 under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).180 CMS did not follow notice-and-comment
procedures when publishing the PDF file. If it was just an interpretive
guidance document, then it was lawful, but if the PDF file was something
more—such as an attempt to rewrite the CLIA regulations—it violated
the APA. Second, the PDF file might be able to escape judicial review, if
viewed as a mere guidance document, because of questions about its
finality181 and ripeness.182 If, despite these barriers, the PDF file
somehow did come under judicial scrutiny, as guidance documents
occasionally do,183 CMS would expect to receive deference under Auer
v. Robbins,184 which gives controlling weight to an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulations, with only limited exceptions.185
The Academies’ Report obligingly characterized CMS’s position as
an “interpretation” of the CLIA regulations, and accorded it controlling

177. Id.
178. See Sean Croston, Recent Development, The Petition is Mightier than the Sword:
Rediscovering an Old Weapon in the Battles Over ‘Regulation by Guidance,’ 63 ADMIN. L. REV.
381, 382 (2011) (defining “guidance documents” as “those official ‘statement[s] of general
applicability and future effect, other than [regulations]’ that set forth ‘a policy on a statutory,
regulatory, or technical issue or an interpretation of a statutory or regulatory issue” (alterations in
original) (quoting The Office of Management and Budget, Final Bulletin for Agency Good
Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3434 (Jan. 25, 2007) (drawing on the Administrative
Procedure Act’s definition of a “rule” at 5 U.S.C. 551(4) in developing this definition)); see also
Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance Documents, 90
TEX. L. REV. 331, 334 n.14 (2011) (using “guidance documents” to refer collectively to policy
statements and interpretive rules).
179. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (2012) (requiring that agencies issuing new legislative rules—
such as a new regulation or an amendment to an existing one—must follow notice and public
comment procedures and publish the rule in the Federal Register at least 30 days before it takes
effect).
180. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
181. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (providing for review of “final agency action”).
182. Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 397, 411–12 (2007).
183. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1023, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(voiding an agency’s guidance document on the basis that the guidance amounted to a regulatory
revision that should have been promulgated according to notice-and-comment procedures).
184. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
185. Id. at 461.
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weight.186 Whether that was appropriate, however, depends on the
jurisdictional provisions of the CLIA statute and regulations, which the
committee was forbidden to examine.187 The discussion below supplies
the omitted analysis, concluding that the CMS PDF file contradicts the
underlying regulation it purports to interpret, attempts to rewrite the
CLIA regulations without notice-and-comment rulemaking and,
moreover, violates the CLIA statute, and thus cannot be viewed as lawful
and controlling.
A. The CLIA Statute’s Jurisdictional Rule
The CLIA statute arose in 1988 when Congress amended188 an earlier
statute, the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act of 1967.189 When the
House bill that became the 1967 CLIA statute was reported out of the
House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, the Chair of that
committee explained that there was no intent to regulate research
laboratories:
We intend by this legislation to cover those commercial
laboratories which are engaged in the business of examining
specimens, and provided an exemption for laboratories not
directly involved in this type of operation such as those
operated by insurance companies.
In addition, it should be pointed out that the bill does not
cover laboratories engaged in research where examination of
specimens is directed toward that end rather than to the
treatment of patients.190
Congress implemented this intent by enacting the CLIA statute’s
jurisdictional provision.191 It states that a facility must comply with CLIA
if it fits within CLIA’s definition of a “laboratory,”192 which is:
a facility for the biological, microbiological, serological,
chemical,
immuno-hematological,
hematological,
biophysical, cytological, pathological, or other examination
of materials derived from the human body [i.e.,
186. See, e.g., REPORT, supra note 10, at 46, 103, 124 (treating the PDF position as an agency
“interpretation” of the CLIA regulations).
187. Id. at 46.
188. See Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-578, 102
Stat. 2903 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 263a (2012)).
189. Pub. L. No. 90-174, 81 Stat. 536 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 263(a)).
190. See 113 CONG. REC. 26,006 (1967) (statement of Rep. Harley O. Staggers).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a).
192. Id.
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biospecimens, such as blood, urine, or tissue samples] for the
purpose of providing information for the diagnosis,
prevention, or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or
the assessment of the health of, human beings.193
The CLIA statute clarifies that this concept of a “laboratory” denotes
a “clinical laboratory.”194 Other laboratory facilities that do not fit this
definition are not subject to CLIA. Figure 1 portrays CLIA’s
jurisdictional provision: facilities that meet the condition in the white area
of Figure 1 are subject to CLIA; those in the shaded area are not. The
laboratory’s intent in providing information from laboratory tests is key.

Laboratory tests provide information in the form of test results and
other data such as genome sequence information. CLIA asks, “For what
use is the laboratory providing information?” According to the CLIA
statute and regulations, a laboratory falls under CLIA if it is “providing
information for the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of any disease or
impairment of, or the assessment of the health of, human beings”195—in
other words, if it is providing information for a list of specific clinical
uses (see white area in Figure 1).

193. Id.; see also 81 Stat. 536 (showing the language of the 1967 version of 42 U.S.C.
§ 263a(a), which was the same as the current jurisdictional provision, except that it used the term
“health of, man” instead of the more modern “health of human beings”).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a).
195. Id. (emphasis added); see also 42 C.F.R. §§ 493.1, 493.2 (2018) (applying the CLIA
regulations to facilities that meet the definition of “laboratory” set out in 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a)).
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CLIA jurisdiction depends not just on what Congress said in 42 U.S.C.
§ 263a(a), but on what Congress refrained from saying. Two textual
omissions are important. The first is that Congress supplied no special,
technical definition of the word “for,” which appears in the jurisdictional
phrase “providing information for diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of
any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the health of, human
beings.”196 Consequently, the word is not a legal term of art and takes its
ordinary, everyday meaning.197 The word “for,” according to its primary
dictionary meaning, is “a function word to indicate purpose” and “to
indicate an intended goal.”198 CLIA jurisdiction thus depends on the
laboratory’s purpose or intended goal199 in providing information from a
test: Does the laboratory intend for the information to be put to a clinical
use (diagnosis, prevention, or treatment, or assessment of health)?
The second and more profound omission is that CLIA supplies no
definitions for the terms “diagnosis,” “prevention,” “treatment,” and
“assessment of health,” which play a central role in determining the scope
of CLIA’s applicability. This omission respects principles of federalism.
The federal power to regulate medical practice, a traditional area of state
regulation, has been a hot-button issue dating back to the intense
legislative debate preceding passage of the 1938 Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act200 and flaring up most recently in connection with the
196. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a) (emphasis added).
197. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 69 (2012) (describing the “Ordinary-Meaning Canon” which provides that “[w]ords are to
be understood in their ordinary, everyday meanings—unless the context indicates that they bear
a technical sense” (emphasis omitted)).
198. See For, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/for (stating, as the primary definition of the word “for”: “1a—used as a function word
to indicate purpose” and “b—used as a function word to indicate an intended goal”).
199. CLIA’s focus on the laboratory’s intent, unsurprisingly, is reminiscent of the approach
Congress followed when defining the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) jurisdiction to
regulate drugs and medical devices. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2012) (defining “drugs” that FDA
has jurisdiction to regulate); id. § 321(h) (defining FDA-regulated devices, including diagnostic
devices). These statutes base FDA’s jurisdiction on the manufacturer’s intended use of the
products. A laboratory’s purpose or intent may seem like interior, psychological phenomena that
would be hard for a regulator to infer, but U.S. federal agencies routinely draw such inferences in
their day-to-day decision-making, based on objective facts such as what the regulated party did
and said and the circumstances in which they acted. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 801.4 (listing objective
data FDA considers in inferring whether a device is “intended” for clinical use).
200. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 1–2252
(2012)); see Joel E. Hoffman, Administrative Procedures of the Food and Drug Administration,
in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT THERAPEUTIC PRODUCTS
13, 17–24 (David G. Adams et al. eds., 1999) (discussing the legislative debate in the late 1930s);
see also Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,455, 16,503
(Aug. 15, 1972) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130) (discussing, in the preamble to a proposed
rulemaking, Congress’s legislative intent in passing the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
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Affordable Care Act.201 There is little doubt that, under modern law, the
federal government has authority to touch medical practice issues
incident to its federal medical product and clinical laboratory regulations,
but Congress and federal agencies make an effort to respect the states’
role.202 The states, through their medical practice acts, other statutes, and
common law, define the scope of medical practice and when it begins and
ends.203
The CLIA statute leaves it for the states to determine whether a
particular human interaction amounts to diagnosing, preventing, or
treating an illness or assessing the person’s health. When revising the
CLIA regulations in 1993, the Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA, the earlier name for today’s CMS) affirmed its intent not to
regulate laboratories that report results for purposes unrelated to the
“patient care context which helps define the scope of the CLIA statute
and these regulations.”204 The states, by setting the boundaries of the
patient care context, ultimately define the scope of CLIA’s jurisdiction.
To summarize, a laboratory falls under CLIA jurisdiction when it
provides information for—in its ordinary, everyday sense of “with the
purpose or intended goal of”—“diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of
any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the health of, human
beings,” as these terms are defined by the relevant states in which these
acts occur.205 If the laboratory is providing information for other, nonclinical uses—such as forensic uses or the pursuit of scientific
discovery—it is not even a “laboratory”206 under CLIA’s definition, and
CLIA does not apply to it. Such a laboratory can operate lawfully without
obtaining a CLIA certificate or meeting the conditions to be CLIAexempt (that is, meeting the conditions required by New York or
Washington state).207 Today, some research laboratories voluntarily
201. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
202. See David G. Adams, The Food and Drug Administration’s Regulation of Health Care
Professionals, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 200, at 423 (noting that
FDA, as a matter of policy, “has traditionally taken the position that it does not regulate the
practice of medicine or pharmacy and has generally avoided regulatory actions that would directly
restrict or interfere with professional service to patients.”).
203. 46 AM. JUR. 2D Existence of Physician and Patient Relationship §§ 3, 5, 6, 9 (2019); see
also Patrick D. Blake, Note, Redefining Physicians’ Duties: An Argument for Eliminating the
Physician-Patient Relationship Requirement in Actions for Medical Malpractice, 40 GA. L. REV.
573, 601 (2006).
204. Health Care Finance Administration, Preamble to revised final CLIA regulations, 58
Fed. Reg. 5,215, 5,218–19 (Jan. 19, 1993).
205. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a) (2012).
206. Id.; see also 42 C.F.R. § 493.2 (2018) (adopting the same definition in the CLIA
regulations).
207. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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choose to comply with CLIA, while others maintain non-CLIA status by
conducting their analyses for non-clinical uses (such as research) rather
than for the clinical uses that trigger jurisdiction under the CLIA statute.
To be clear, the above discussion was merely quoting the CLIA statute
(reporting what the statute says), not interpreting it. The Report at times
dismissed scholarly works that merely quote statutes as “[r]elying on
principles of statutory interpretation.”208 The Report thus embraced a
view that “the statute is not the law, but only an [interpretation] of it.”209
By this view, an agency that flouts the plain language of a statute is
merely “interpreting” it, and scholars who quote statutes are merely
advancing an alternative interpretation.
In reality, what the law is depends on what the law says, with federal
statutes sitting near the top of the legal evidentiary hierarchy.210 If you
want to know the scope of permissible CMS regulation and actions under
CLIA, you have to read the CLIA statute. Astonishingly, the Report’s
SOT dismissed the CLIA statute as a source of evidence of what the law
is, and instead assumed the CMS PDF file to be controlling without
analyzing its fidelity to the statute.211 This should have been a red flag.
Until Congress amends the CLIA statute, it is the law. CMS has no
authority to take positions in conflict with that law. This fundamental fact
is core to any consideration of the topics addressed in the Academies’
Report.
B. Applying CLIA’s Jurisdictional Rule to Research Laboratories—
the History
Applying CLIA’s jurisdictional rule to research laboratories raises
issues that were considered at the very birth of the current CLIA
regulations. HCFA grappled with these complexities during the 1992
rulemaking that drew the contours of today’s CLIA regulations.212 This
history is enlightening.
Even though Congress disclaimed intent to regulate research
facilities,213 many research laboratories sought further reassurance that
208. See, e.g., REPORT, supra note 10, at 316.
209. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 197, at 397 (criticizing the mistaken view that “[t]he
statute is not the law, but only evidence of it”).
210. See, e.g., Pennington v. Coxe, 6 U.S. 33, 52 (1804) (“That a law is the best expositor of
itself.”).
211. See, e.g., REPORT, supra note 10, at 7 box S-2 (quoting the REPORT’s SOT, which
provides that “[t]he committee will also not provide any legal interpretation or analysis regarding
the scope or applicability of CLIA”).
212. See Regulations Implementing the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of
1988 (CLIA), 57 Fed. Reg. 7,002, 7,002–16 (Feb. 28, 1992) (codified in scattered sections of 42
C.F.R.).
213. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
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they would not fall under the CLIA regulations. To allay these concerns,
HCFA initially proposed to have the CLIA regulations embed a research
exception within their definition of a regulated laboratory.214 This
proposal drew fire, however, because some research laboratories wanted
to fall under CLIA jurisdiction.215 A laboratory cannot bill Medicare
unless it is CLIA-certified, and these research laboratories wanted “to
assure that they can continue to receive reimbursement for tests
performed.”216 HCFA responded that “[i]f the results of such
‘experimental’ testing are used for individual treatment of the patient
tested, the laboratory would be subject to CLIA requirements.”217 In other
words, if a research laboratory plans to bill a health insurer or Medicare
for a test, then it clearly is providing information with an intent for
clinical use and, under CLIA’s definition, it is a clinical laboratory.
HCFA ultimately concluded that the CLIA statute’s jurisdictional
provision “clearly defines the type of facility subject to regulation and is
specific with respect to its applicability to facilities that conduct testing
for the medical diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of individuals.”218
These words, written after Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,219 had profound significance. When Congress
clearly speaks to an issue there is no room for federal agencies or courts
to interpret the statute; they must simply follow it.220 HCFA understood
this legal principle and determined that the statute’s language, being
clear, left no room for the CLIA regulations to further interpret the
agency’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, HCFA decided that the CLIA
regulations should simply repeat—or “parrot”221—the same
jurisdictional language that the CLIA statute uses to define a CLIAregulated “laboratory.”222 Table 1 compares the statutory and regulatory
language.
214. See Regulations Implementing the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of
1988 (CLIA), 55 Fed. Reg. 20,896, 20,917 (proposed May 21, 1990) (codified as amended at 42
C.F.R. § 493.2) (defining “laboratory” at 42 C.F.R. § 493.2 which added to the statutory language
at 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a)).
215. Regulations Implementing the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988,
57 Fed. Reg. at 7015.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 7014.
219. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
220. See id. at 842–83 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.”).
221. See 1 PIERCE, supra note 82, § 6.11, at 527 (discussing “parroting” regulations that
merely incorporate language taken from a statute).
222. See 42 C.F.R. § 493.2 (2018) (following Congress’s definition of “laboratory” verbatim
in the text of the current CLIA regulation).
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Table 1. Parroted Jurisdictional Language
Jurisdiction-triggering conditions:
an act + scienter
CLIA Statute
A facility becomes subject to the CLIA statute
by:
42 U.S.C. § 263a(a)
“providing information for the diagnosis,
prevention, or treatment of any disease or
impairment of, or the assessment of the health
of, human beings.”223
CLIA Regulations A facility becomes subject to the CLIA
regulations by:
42 C.F.R. §§ 493.1,
“providing information for the diagnosis,
493.2
prevention, or treatment of any disease or
impairment of, or the assessment of the health
of, human beings.”224
Source

The jurisdictional language is identical: The CLIA statute, at 42
U.S.C. § 263a(a), provides that a facility becomes subject to the CLIA
statute by “providing information for the diagnosis, prevention, or
treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the health
of, human beings.”225 The CLIA regulations, at 42 C.F.R. §§ 493.1,
493.2, apply this same rule.226
Both these passages require two conditions to be met, before a
laboratory falls under the CLIA regulations. First, the laboratory must
perform an act (“providing information”).227 Second, the laboratory must
perform this act for an enumerated list of purposes: “for the diagnosis,
prevention, or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the
assessment of the health of, human beings.”228 This second condition
amounts to a scienter requirement: it is not merely the act, but the
laboratory’s intent when performing the act, that triggers CLIA
regulation.
The preamble to the 1992 final rule makes clear that when research
laboratories report individual-specific results without an intent for
clinical use, they are not subject to the CLIA regulations: “Several
commenters [in that proceeding] noted that research laboratories
including National Institutes of Health (NIH) laboratories perform
experimental tests on human specimens and may include test information
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

42 U.S.C. § 263a(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
See 42 C.F.R. § 493.2.
42 U.S.C. § 263a(a); 42 C.F.R. § 493.2.
42 U.S.C. § 263a(a); 42 C.F.R. § 493.2.
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in the patient’s medical record for completeness.”229 These research
laboratories were concerned that this reporting of individual-specific
results might place them under the new CLIA regulations.230 HCFA
concluded this was not the case and, to reassure them, HCFA inserted
CLIA’s research exception at 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2).231 This exception
stresses that the CLIA regulations do not apply unless research
laboratories “report patient specific results for the diagnosis, prevention
or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the
health of individual patients.”232 Table 2 compares the research exception
to the jurisdictional language of the CLIA statute and regulations.
Table 2. Parroted language in the CLIA research exception
Source
Jurisdictional conditions: an act + scienter
CLIA Statute and A facility triggers CLIA jurisdiction by:
Regulations
“providing information for the diagnosis,
prevention, or treatment of any disease or
42 U.S.C. § 263a(a); impairment of, or the assessment of the health
42 C.F.R. §§ 493.1, of, human beings.”233
493.2
CLIA Research
A facility escapes CLIA jurisdiction if it:
Exception
“do[es] not report patient specific results
for the diagnosis, prevention or treatment of
42 C.F.R.
any disease or impairment of, or the
§ 493.3(b)(2)
assessment of the health of . . . individual
patients.”234
The research exception parrots the same scienter requirement seen in
the CLIA statute and regulations: The jurisdictional provisions provide
that a facility triggers CLIA jurisdiction by “providing information for
the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of any disease or impairment of,
229. Id. Regulations Implementing the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of
1988 (CLIA), 57 Fed. Reg. 7002, 7015 (Feb. 28, 1992) (to be codified in scattered sections of 42
C.F.R.).
230. Id.
231. See id. (“In the proposed rule at § 493.2 under the definition of ‘laboratory’ we indicated
that ‘laboratories that perform research testing on human specimens, but do not report patient
specific results for the diagnosis, prevention or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the
assessment of the health of an individual patient are not considered laboratories under CLIA.’
However, this exception was not included in § 493.3, ‘Applicability.’ Thus, we have amended
this section to reflect this exception for research laboratories.”).
232. 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2).
233. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a) (2012) (emphasis added); see also 42 C.F.R. § 493.2 (stating the
same).
234. 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2).
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or the assessment of the health of, human beings.”235 The research
exception emphasizes that a facility avoids CLIA jurisdiction if it “do[es]
not report patient specific results for the diagnosis, prevention or
treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the health
of individual patients.”236
The research exception highlights that reporting “patient specific
results” (as opposed to providing information more generally) is the act
that potentially raises concerns at a research laboratory.237 Yet even if a
laboratory reports “patient specific results,” it escapes CLIA regulation if
the reporting is for non-clinical purposes.
In the 1992 CLIA rulemaking preamble, HCFA explained that
reporting patient-specific experimental test results into a patient’s
medical record “for completeness” does not, by itself, violate the research
exception and trigger CLIA regulation.238 However, reporting patientspecific results “for individual treatment of the patient tested”239 would
cause the laboratory to fall under CLIA. According to HCFA’s
interpretation, reporting individual research results into a patient’s
medical record for the sake of record-keeping “completeness” does not
amount to “treatment” and is not a clinical use, even though the record in
question is the person’s medical record.
HCFA’s 1992 interpretation carries considerable legal weight because
it appears in the preamble to a final rule in which HCFA was exercising
its congressionally delegated authority to promulgate regulations
consistent with the CLIA statute’s jurisdictional language, after notice
and an opportunity for the public to comment. HCFA’s interpretation thus
would be Chevron-eligible under current doctrines.240 Courts following
these doctrines would tend to view HCFA’s interpretation as controlling.
According to HCFA, it is not the mere act of reporting individual-specific
results, but the laboratory’s reason for doing so, that triggers CLIA
regulation of a research laboratory. HCFA’s interpretation closely
follows the text of the CLIA statute and its scienter requirement.

235. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a); see also 42 C.F.R. § 493.2 (stating the same).
236. 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2).
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, 57 Fed. Reg. 7015 (Feb. 28,
1992) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 493).
240. See generally United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (addressing the
applicability of judicial deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. to statements agencies make during notice-and-comment rulemaking and in less
formal settings).
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IV. CMS’S RECENT POSITION ON ITS JURISDICTION TO REGULATE
RESEARCH LABS
In its 2014 PDF file CMS asserts far broader jurisdiction to regulate
research laboratories than HCFA claimed in 1992 when the agency
promulgated the CLIA regulations.241 As recited in the Academies’
Report, CMS’s current position is that “only those facilities performing
research testing on human biospecimens that do not report patientspecific results may qualify to be excepted from CLIA certification.”242
By this view, research laboratories operating under CLIA’s research
exception243 will fall under the CLIA regulations if they report individualspecific research results for any purpose, including for non-clinical uses.
Part IV discusses CMS’s PDF file and concludes that it is contrary to the
CLIA statute and regulations and merits no deference.
A. Ambivalence and Statutory Deviations
During 2014, CMS displayed considerable ambivalence about the
position expressed in the PDF file. On February 6 of that year, CMS
joined OCR, which administers the HIPAA Privacy Rule and GINA’s
genetic privacy provisions,244 in promulgating the final rule245 expanding
HIPAA’s individual access right to include data stored at HIPAAcovered laboratories. CMS’s participation in that rulemaking is highquality legal evidence that CMS saw no conflict between HIPAA’s access
right and the CLIA regulations on that date. It is presumed that federal
regulators are competent and know what is in the regulations they
promulgate and would not knowingly issue a new regulation that conflicts
with other laws. On February 6, 2014, CMS apparently felt there was no
conflict between the HIPAA and CLIA regulations.
Eight months later, with the new laboratory access right set to take
effect on October 6, a group of NIH-funded researchers pointed out that
HIPAA’s access right seems to include individual access to uninterpreted
(raw) data as well as interpreted genomic test results246—a view that OCR

74).

241. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 74.
242. REPORT, supra note 10, at 9 (quoting Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note

243. See 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2).
244. See Delegation of Authority to OCR to Implement/Enforce HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra
note 53; see also Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233,
§ 105(b), 122 Stat. 881, 905 (delegating responsibility to implement GINA’s privacy mandate to
HHS and, by implication, to OCR based on the earlier subdelegation of HHS’s HIPAA
responsibilities to OCR).
245. CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 7290, 7290 (Feb. 6, 2014) (to
be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 493, 45 C.F.R. pt. 164).
246. See Evans et al., supra note 114, at 801.
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subsequently confirmed in a 2016 guidance document.247 At some
genomic research laboratories, the prospect of having to provide access
to data and results creates various concerns that the Academies’ Report
describes: concerns, for example, that participants might be confused by
access to potentially unreliable research data,248 and that implementing
the access right could be costly and burdensome for researchers and
might reduce their productivity.249 The Report emphasizes that funds for
biomedical research “are precious and require careful and responsible
stewardship,” and allowing participants to have such broad data access
requires resources.250 In short, providing HIPAA access might be costly
and inconvenient for researchers
Whether motivated by these concerns or others, CMS abruptly
reversed course on or about December 2014, posting the PDF file251 on
its CLIA web page. The file does not disclose its authorship, leaving it
unclear whether it is an official statement by CMS.252 Posting it on
CMS’s CLIA web page, however, creates the impression that CMS
endorses it. It resembles a guidance document,253 but it has none of the
disclaimers with which federal agencies often adorn guidance documents
(such as a statement that it is non-binding).254 It seems to state a position
that CMS plans to enforce.
The PDF file implies that there is a conflict between the HIPAA and
CLIA regulations, thus supplying a pretext for non-CLIA research
laboratories to avoid complying with HIPAA’s access right. This asserted
conflict has added to confusion. In the face of this alleged conflict, OCR
has seemed reluctant to enforce the access right at research laboratories.
Enforcement has long been an issue under HIPAA. The weakness of
HIPAA’s administrative enforcement structure255 has been particularly
247. Individuals’ Right under HIPAA to Access their Health Information 45 CFR § 164.524,
supra note 149.
248. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 71, 204, 211, 218.
249. See id. at 73.
250. Id. at 59 (stating that allowing participants to have such broad data access “necessarily
requires the diversion of some research resources from the primary goal of the research”).
251. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 74.
252. See id.
253. See supra note 178.
254. See Mendelson, supra note 182, at 401 n.17 (noting that including such disclaimers in
guidance documents has been more systematic since 2000, when several agencies were criticized
for failure to make clear whether their statements were intended to be non-binding/nonlegislative
versus binding/legislative); see also H.R. REP. NO. 106-1009, at 8–9 (2000) (leveling such
criticisms).
255. See HHS, HIPAA Recommendations, supra note 123 (expressing concern, in a report to
Congress, that the HIPAA statute’s lack of a private right of action would undermine protections
under the HIPAA Privacy Rule and calling on Congress to enact new health privacy legislation
containing a private right of action, which Congress did not do).
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evident throughout this CLIA-HIPAA impasse. The Privacy Rule lacks a
private right of action allowing citizen lawsuits to enforce its
requirements.256 Enforcement depends on OCR. If this Office for Civil
Rights goes wobbly on civil rights enforcement, as it did in this instance,
it is difficult for research participants to enlist the federal courts to resolve
questions of law such as “Is there, or is there not, a conflict between
HIPAA and CLIA?”257 An office committed to diligent civil rights
enforcement would have carefully scrutinized the CMS assertion of a
conflict between HIPAA and CLIA regulations and, if necessary, would
have pressed for rapid resolution of this question. Instead, the impasse
has dragged on for four years, with research participants frequently
denied a core federal privacy right while it festers.258
To those versed in administrative law, the PDF file had all the
markings of an embattled agency seeking to appease its regulated
industry by blocking an unpopular new regulation.259 A 2006 report by
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) documented prior
incidents in which CMS used informal means to circumvent the CLIA
statute to reduce regulatory burdens on laboratories.260 In one instance,
GAO found CMS had reduced the frequency of proficiency testing at
many laboratories from quarterly, as the CLIA statute requires, to three
times per year.261 When GAO requested the administrative record on
which CMS based this decision, “CMS supplied a brief, undated
narrative”262 and justified its deviation from the statute by claiming the
“reduced frequency would provide a ‘needed respite’ to both laboratories
and proficiency testing providers.”263 “According to CMS’s justification,
experts were divided on the appropriate frequency of proficiency testing
256. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.306 (2018); see also Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 571–72 (5th
Cir. 2006) (holding, in the first federal appellate decision to address this issue, that the Privacy
Rule does not create a private right of action).
257. See Mendelson, supra note 182, at 423–24 (discussing the difficulties regulatory
beneficiaries—such as research participants—face in challenging agencies that fail to protect their
rights).
258. See, e.g., Lye et al., supra note 27 (providing empirical data demonstrating the difficulty
individuals experience exercising their HIPAA access rights); see also Keating, supra note 27
(chronicling the difficulty obtaining access to one’s own genomic test results from research); K.
McGowan, The Man Who Dissected His Own Brain, WIRED (Feb. 11, 2016, 12:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2016/02/the-man-who-dissected-his-own-brain/ (interviewing Keating)
[https://perma.cc/TB82-C8FL].
259. CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 7290, 7290 (Feb. 6, 2014) (to
be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 493, 45 C.F.R. pt. 164).
260. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-416, CLINICAL LAB QUALITY: CMS
AND SURVEY ORGANIZATION OVERSIGHT SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED (2006).
261. See id. at 33.
262. Id. at 52.
263. Id.
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generally,”264 suggesting an ethos that federal laws can be ignored if
expert option disfavors them.
The current situation with HIPAA access evokes the pattern GAO
observed. With its “brief, undated” PDF file, CMS effectively granted
research laboratories a “needed respite”265 from a burdensome federal
law—HIPAA’s laboratory access right—on which researchers,
laboratories, and experts are “divided,”266 as the Academies’ Report
shows.267 Research participants had no say in whether they wanted a
“respite”268 from their federally protected privacy rights. Finally, CMS
did not follow the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA)269 notice-andcomment rulemaking procedures270 or even its guidance publication
requirements271 when posting its PDF file, which denied research
participants a chance to protest as their newly created access rights were,
in practical effect, rescinded.
B. CMS’s Recent Position
The PDF file summarizes CLIA’s research exception in the following
manner:
Depending on the circumstances, research testing can be
either excepted from CLIA or subject to CLIA. Specifically,
testing facilities may qualify to be excepted from CLIA
certification if they meet the description of “research
laboratories” provided by the CLIA regulation at 42 C.F.R.
§ 493.3(b)(2). In accordance with that regulation, only those
facilities performing research testing on human specimens
that do not report patient-specific results may qualify to
be excepted from CLIA certification.272
However, the regulatory text of CLIA’s research exception at 42
C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2) actually says:
(b) Exception. These rules [the CLIA regulations] do not
264. Id. at 34.
265. Id. at 52.
266. Id. at 34.
267. See supra notes 248–50 and accompanying text.
268. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 262 at 52.
269. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551–59, 701–06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (2012)).
270. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c).
271. See id. § 553(b)(3)(A) (providing an exception to the APA’s notice-and-comment
requirement for interpretive rules/guidance documents). But see id. § 552(a)(1)(D) (requiring
interpretative rules to be published in the Federal Register).
272. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 74.
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apply to components or functions of . . .
(2) Research laboratories that test human specimens but do
not report patient specific results for the diagnosis,
prevention or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or
the assessment of the health of individual patients . . . .273
The PDF file interprets this regulation as if it had a period after the
phrase “patient specific results,” so that the twenty-one-word clause
appearing after that phrase is inoperant and, in effect, deleted. The PDF
file explains this deletion by noting:
In most cases, research testing where patient-specific
results are reported from the laboratory, and those results
will or could be used “for the diagnosis, prevention, or
treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the assessment
of the health of, human beings” are presumed to be subject
to CLIA, absent evidence to the contrary.274
This explanation interprets CLIA’s research exception as giving rise
to a rebuttable presumption that any patient-specific results that a
laboratory reports “will or could be” misused for a clinical purpose, with
the laboratory bearing the burden of proof to rebut the presumption with
contrary evidence. The CLIA regulation creates no such presumption or
burden of proof, nor does the CLIA statute.275 In a 2017 public statement,
a CMS official went farther and suggested that the PDF file’s
presumption that all research laboratory reporting is for a clinical purpose
is irrebuttable:
CLIA applies when. . .
Patient specific results are reported from the laboratory to
another entity and the results are available and can be used
for health care for individual patients.
In general, when patient-specific results are reported from
the laboratory, it is assumed that they will or could be used
for patient care purposes; therefore, they are subject to
CLIA.276
The PDF file—and the above statement—do not merely “interpret”
the CLIA regulation; they revise it. An example demonstrates the point:
273. 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2) (2018).
274. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 74.
275. See supra text accompanying Part III, fig.1.
276. Karen Dryer, Return of Genetic Results in the All of Us Research Program (Day 2),
NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (Mar. 7, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://videocast.nih.gov/summary.asp?Live
=21887&bhcp=1 (1:16:55).
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Suppose a law says, “Motor vehicles can be impounded if they are driven
for commission of a felony.” The agency responsible for enforcing this
law publishes a written policy statement interpreting this as saying,
“Motor vehicles can be impounded if they are driven.” In a public speech,
an agency official justifies this policy by noting, “In general, when motor
vehicles are driven, it is assumed that they will or could be used for
commission of a felony; therefore, they are subject to being impounded.”
That is not an interpretation of the law; it is a material change of law.
C. Does CMS’s Position Merit Deference?
When an agency interprets its own regulations, courts generally grant
it the highest level of deference, variously called Seminole deference,
after the 1945 case, Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,277 or Auer
deference for a later case that explained it well.278 Some scholars view
Auer deference as being even stronger than the Chevron deference
agencies often receive when interpreting statutes.279 The rationale for the
heightened deference is that the agency that originally wrote a regulation
is particularly well qualified to interpret its meaning.280
Under Auer, courts would treat an agency’s interpretation of its
regulation as controlling unless that view is “plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation”281 or violates a statute or the
Constitution.282 The PDF file, as just described, is inconsistent with the
text of the regulation it purports to interpret.283 As the HHS Secretary’s
Advisory Committee on Human Research Protections (SACHRP) noted
in its own analysis of the situation, CMS’s position “seems at odds with
the plain language of the regulation, which prohibits performing a nonCLIA-certified laboratory test for purposes of diagnosing or treating a

277. 325 U.S. 410 (1945). Seminole Rock was cited and followed more recently in Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
278. See, e.g., Conor Clarke, Note, The Uneasy Case Against Auer and Seminole Rock, 33
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 175, 175 (2015).
279. See Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Anti-Parroting Canon, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 290,
292 n.5 (2011) (citing scholars who hold this view, but noting that it is not universally held).
280. Id. at 291.
281. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)).
282. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993) (“As we have often stated, provided an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations does not violate the Constitution or a federal statute,
it must be given ‘controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.’” (quoting Bowles, 325 U.S. at 410)); see also 1 PIERCE, supra note 82, § 6.4, at 439
(“Stinson is consistent with many opinions issued both before and after Stinson.”).
283. 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2) (2018).
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person, but does not prohibit data releases required by law or for other
purposes.”284 This inconsistency precludes Auer deference.
If that were not enough, an additional exception to Auer deference is
pertinent. The 2006 case of Gonzales v. Oregon285 recognized an
exception to Auer deference when an agency is interpreting a regulation
that simply parrots, or incorporates, statutory language.286 The rationale
for Auer deference—that the agency is interpreting regulatory language
that the agency itself wrote—breaks down when an agency interprets
statutory language written by Congress. In this situation, the interpretive
question is “not the meaning of the regulation but the meaning of the
statute”287 that the regulation copies. The appropriate level of deference
would ordinarily be Chevron, but because the PDF was not generated
through a notice-and-comment proceeding, the lesser deference
described in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,288 or Skidmore deference, is
warranted.289
CMS’s 2014 PDF file falls squarely in this latter exception to Auer
deference. The PDF file discusses regulatory language drawn verbatim
from the CLIA statute. In one place, it mentions the phrase, “for the
diagnosis, prevention or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the
assessment of the health of individual patients” that appears in the CLIA
research exception. Yet the PDF file eliminates this phrase when it states
that “only those facilities performing research testing on human
specimens that do not report patient-specific results may qualify to be
excepted from CLIA certification.”290 The phrase in question came
directly from the CLIA statute; it is not CMS’s language to toss away.
Because CMS published the PDF file without notice-and-comment
procedures, its interpretation of this statutory language is only eligible for
Skidmore deference.291 Under Skidmore, the PDF file would receive
284. See Sec’y’s Advisory Comm. on Human Research Prots., supra note 81.
285. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
286. Id. at 256–58; see Volokh, supra note 279, at 292 (discussing this so-called “antiparroting canon”); see also 1 PIERCE, supra note 82, at § 6.11, 527–29 (“The Gonzales majority
recognized that the rule the agency purported to interpret was not literally a parroting rule.”).
287. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 257.
288. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
289. See id. at 140 (“The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon
the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
power to control.”). See generally United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (addressing
the applicability of judicial deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council to statements agencies make during notice-and-comment rulemaking and in less formal
settings).
290. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 74.
291. See 1 PIERCE, supra note 82, § 6.4, at 435 (noting that “the Chevron test does not apply
to interpretive rules” that are exempt from the notice and comment procedure of APA § 553).
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respect proportional to its “power to persuade”292 and courts would
consider the thoroughness, logic, and expertness of the agency’s
interpretation when deciding whether to defer to it.293 The PDF file offers
no discussion or explanation of why it is inconsistent with the statute it
purports to interpret. Its silence is thuddingly unpersuasive.
Moreover, CMS’s position does not reflect a “fair and considered
judgment on the matter in question,” which Justice Scalia once argued
(albeit in a dissent) should warrant Chevron deference regardless of
whether an agency followed notice-and-comment procedures.294 Far
from being a “considered judgment,” CMS’s December 2014 PDF file
was a hasty flip-flop reversing a position CMS took ten months earlier
when it promulgated the final rule expanding HIPAA’s access right.
Moreover, the PDF file contradicts the longstanding HCFA interpretation
announced in the original 1992 CLIA rulemaking.295
Finally, the inconsistency between the PDF file and the CLIA statute
goes to a matter of special sensitivity: the scope of CMS’s jurisdiction to
regulate research laboratories. Congress, by statute, placed a limiting
condition on CMS’s jurisdiction: CMS can regulate research laboratories
only if they provide information “for the diagnosis, prevention, or
treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the health
of, human beings.”296 The PDF file assumes that a research laboratory
that reports results for any use is doing so for clinical use, because the
results “could be” misused by third parties downstream of the point when
the laboratory reports them to the individual.297 The surplusage canon of
textual construction favors the view that every word of a statute or
regulation should be treated as operant, with none ignored.298 As one
justice put it, “These words cannot be meaningless, else they would not
have been used.”299 The PDF file treats Congress’s scienter requirement
as functionally meaningless.
CMS’s position ignores the limiting condition Congress placed on
CMS’s jurisdiction, by assuming that condition to be met absent evidence
to the contrary. Assuming it to be met removes a crucial constraint that
Congress imposed on CMS’s authority to regulate research laboratories.
Eskridge and Baer, in their empirical study of case outcomes, found that
courts look more harshly on agency statements when the agency “is
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
Id.
1 PIERCE, supra note 82, § 6.4, at 436.
See supra Part III.
42 U.S.C. § 263a(a) (2012); 42 C.F.R. § 493.2 (2018).
See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 74.
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 197, at 174.
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936).
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interpreting its own jurisdiction or authority” rather than statements in
which an “agency applies its regulations to a matter of detail, [and] is not
interpreting its own jurisdiction or regulatory authority.”300 This again
counsels that CMS’s current view of its jurisdiction to regulate research
laboratories is suspect.
CMS’s PDF file does not go to a matter of detail. It reflects an agency
significantly expanding its jurisdiction and doing so “on the sly”301 by
posting an undated PDF file instead of acting openly and transparently
through appropriate APA notice-and-comment procedures.302 Note,
however, that even if CMS had followed APA rulemaking procedures,
agencies cannot do what the PDF file attempts to do. Even with APA
rulemaking, agencies cannot amend federal statutes, which only
Congress can do.
The position stated in the PDF file does not merit Auer deference. In
fact, the PDF attempts to assert regulatory authority over research
laboratories that Congress never granted the agency. The Report’s SOT,
and the Report itself, erred by assuming the PDF reflects current law.
V. ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTIONS PRODUCE FLAWED RECOMMENDATIONS
The Report bases a sweeping legal reform agenda on an assumption
that two federal regulations—the HIPAA Privacy Rule and the CLIA
regulations—are in conflict, so that non-CLIA research laboratories
cannot provide HIPAA access to individual-specific data without
becoming subject to CLIA.303 The Report further assumes that
researchers cannot return results from non-CLIA labs without risking the
same violation. A basic legal analysis would have proved these
assumptions wrong.
A. The Report’s Flawed Assumptions
Complying with HIPAA’s access right causes a HIPAA-regulated
research laboratory to fall under CLIA only if the laboratory does so
300. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J.
1083, 1130 (2008).
301. Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and
the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L. J. 1311, 1323, 1379
(1992).
302. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012).
303. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 250 tbl.6-2 (stating that a non-CLIA-certified laboratory
has a legal obligation to make “[m]andatory disclosure under HIPAA (but act of disclosure then
requires laboratory to become CLIA-certified)”—in other words, the required act of providing
access to data under HIPAA will trigger CLIA jurisdiction for laboratories that would not
otherwise be subject to the CLIA regulation).
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intending to provide data for clinical use.304 A research laboratory
reporting data pursuant to a HIPAA access request has intent, first of all,
to comply with federal privacy law and, secondarily, to promote the
legislative and regulatory objectives the Privacy Rule serves.305 A
research laboratory providing information for HIPAA-compliance
purposes lacks the scienter—intent to provide data for clinical use—that
gives rise to CLIA jurisdiction. If a research laboratory is not otherwise
subject to CLIA, the mere act of providing HIPAA access will not cause
the laboratory to fall under CLIA.
Similarly, the mere act of returning research results and data will not
trigger the need for CLIA compliance. What matters is the laboratory’s
purpose in reporting those results and data. If the purpose is to produce
results and data for direct use in diagnosis, prevention, treatment, or
health assessment, then CLIA is triggered. However, if the laboratory is
not providing results and data for these purposes, but as part of the ethical
conduct of research, CLIA is not triggered and the CLIA research
exception applies.
Congress recognized, as it passed the 1967 CLIA statute, that research
activities may or may not cause a laboratory to fall under CLIA. Congress
intended for CLIA not to cover “laboratories engaged in research where
examination of specimens is directed toward that end” but wanted CLIA
to cover research laboratories where testing was directed at “treatment of
patients.”306 In some research, especially clinical research,307 laboratories
are generating results to be directly used in clinical care and use of a
CLIA-compliant laboratory is necessary. However, in other research, the
laboratory results are not intended for direct use in clinical care.
Over the past two decades, researchers have worked in close
collaboration with ethicists and legal scholars to develop consensus
guidelines to ensure appropriate return of results mindful of CLIA
requirements.308 It is essential to understand how these guidelines work.
They envision three scenarios, corresponding to three separate pathways
for the return of results and data from research laboratories.
In the first scenario, a laboratory generates a research result or data
intending its direct use in clinical care without any further confirmatory
304. See discussion supra Parts III & IV.
305. See discussion supra Part II.
306. 113 CONG. REC. 26,006 (1967) (statement of Rep. Harley O. Staggers).
307. See Wylie M. Burke et al., Return of Results: Ethical and Legal Distinctions Between
Research and Clinical Care, 166C AM. J. MED. GENETICS PART C: SEMINARS MED. GENETICS 105,
107 (2014) (explaining that the scope of clinical practice is a matter of state law, and that states
generally do not regard it as clinical care to recommend that a person should seek clinical care or
to make a referral to clinical care).
308. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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testing at a CLIA-certified clinical laboratory. If this is the case, the
research laboratory must comply with CLIA: the laboratory has the
scienter that triggers CLIA regulation. Thus, the first pathway for return
of results is simply to conduct research using a CLIA-compliant
laboratory. That way, if any of the research results raise clinical concerns,
they can be freely repurposed for clinical use without violating CLIA,
because the research laboratory already complies with CLIA. This is a
pathway many research laboratories follow.
As the Academies’ Report notes, however, it is not practical or costeffective for all research laboratories to comply with CLIA.309 When a
non-CLIA research laboratory encounters a finding that raises potential
clinical concerns, there are two remaining options. The second pathway
for returning results is for the laboratory to arrange confirmatory testing
at a CLIA-compliant laboratory before returning the results.310 This
second pathway is also widely recognized.311 It ensures that information
ultimately returned is from a CLIA-compliant laboratory. Here again,
there is no dispute that this pathway achieves appropriate CLIA
compliance. The primary objection is that it entails incremental costs for
the research laboratory, contributing to the perception that returning
results diverts funds from the goals of the research.312
Responsive to this concern, there is a third pathway—the clinical
hand-off—which does not require confirmatory testing prior to return.
Instead, the research laboratory advises the participant—or the
participant’s physician, or both—that a research finding suggests a need
for follow-up clinical testing and evaluation. The research laboratory is
careful to communicate that the research finding is from a non-CLIA
laboratory and requires clinical confirmation in a CLIA-compliant
laboratory and clinical evaluation, and stresses that the research findings
should not be used in clinical care without that confirmation and
evaluation. The research laboratory carefully avoids rendering any
diagnosis or making any treatment recommendations based on the
research result, leaving that to the clinician.
According to the CMS position, all three scenarios constitute a clinical
use of research data, so the third scenario, which conveys research
findings to trigger a CLIA-compliant clinical evaluation, violates CLIA.
This is simply incorrect. As explained earlier,313 the CLIA statute and
regulations defer to state law to define the scope of clinical care. State
law recognizes a distinction between referring a patient for clinical care
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

See REPORT, supra note 10, at 102–03.
See id. at 104.
See, e.g., id. at 104, 164.
See id. at 164.
See supra Part III.
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and providing clinical care.314 Under state law, an activity is medical
practice only if there is a provider–patient relationship and clinical care
is taking place within the scope of that relationship.315 Physician–patient
relationships are contractual in nature: “the express or implied consent of
the physician is required” in order for a physician–patient relationship to
come into being, and “the physician must take some affirmative action
with regard to treatment of a patient for the relationship to be
established.”316 Even assuming the researcher happens to be a physician,
returning results for the narrow purpose of making a clinical referral does
not involve the critical treatment step: “A physician-patient relationship
is not established by the mere act of a physician agreeing to see a patient
at a later time or suggesting that the patient contact another physician.”317
Reporting a research result for the purpose of referring a person for
clinical testing and evaluation is not itself a clinical use,318 and therefore
does not give rise to CLIA compliance obligations.
Thus the CLIA statute and regulations, properly understood, already
allow all three pathways. It is the CMS PDF file that has gone off track.
The agency—in effect—assumes that federalism does not exist and that
CMS itself, rather than the states, has authority to decide what is and is
not a clinical use of test results. That is incorrect. When promulgating the
CLIA regulations,319 HCFA also expressed its intent “to allow States to
determine who is authorized to order tests.”320 Congress has not
authorized CMS to preempt state law in this area, and Congress certainly
has not authorized CMS to preempt state law by posting informal PDF
files.321 Under state law, it does not constitute clinical care for a nonCLIA-compliant research laboratory to provide information for the
purpose of recommending follow-up clinical testing.322

314. See Burke et al., supra note 307.
315. See Richard J. Kohlman, Existence of Physician and Patient Relationship, 46 AM. JUR.,
POF 2d 373, § 3 (Feb. 2019); see also Barbara J. Evans, Minimizing Liability Risks Under the
ACMG Recommendations for Reporting Incidental Findings in Clinical Exome and Genome
Sequencing, 15 GENET. MED. 915, 917 (2013) (noting that physician–patient relationships have
an agreed scope, e.g., cardiologists are not responsible for a patient’s orthopedic care unless the
patient and physician agree to such an expansion of scope).
316. 61 Am. Jur. 2d Physicians, Surgeons, Etc. § 130 (2019).
317. Id. (footnote omitted).
318. See id.
319. Regulations Implementing the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988
(CLIA), 57 Fed. Reg. 7002, 7015 (Feb. 28, 1992) (to be codified in scattered sections of 42
C.F.R.).
320. See id. at 7013.
321. See id.
322. See 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, Etc. § 130 (2019).
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B. Recommendations on Data Privacy
The Report assumes a HIPAA-CLIA regulatory conflict that does not
exist and then proposes sweeping changes to the Privacy Rule to resolve
the imagined conflict.323 Table 3 summarizes three of the Report’s
recommendations that raise particular concerns.
Table 3. Legally problematic privacy recommendations
in the Academies’ Report324
Rec. 12A
“[T]he Office for Civil Rights (OCR) of the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) should
define the DRS to include only individual research results
generated in a CLIA-certified laboratory or under the
externally accountable quality management system for
research laboratories (see Recommendation 2).”325
Rec. 12B
“OCR should require all HIPAA-covered entities that
conduct research on human biospecimens to develop a
plan that is reviewed and approved by the IRB for the
release of individual research results in the designated
record set to participants in a responsive manner when
required under HIPAA.”326
Rec. 12C
“CMS should revise CLIA regulations such that when
there is a legal obligation under the HIPAA access right to
return individual research results, a laboratory will not be
considered in violation of CLIA and need not obtain CLIA
certification before satisfying this legal obligation.”327
The Report’s Recommendation 12C is that “CMS should revise CLIA
regulations such that when there is a legal obligation under the HIPAA
access right to return individual research results, a laboratory will not be
considered in violation of CLIA and need not obtain CLIA certification
before satisfying this legal obligation”328 This recommendation strangely
calls for CMS to amend the CLIA regulation to make the regulation say
what it currently already says. A more appropriate recommendation
would be for CMS to revise its PDF file to bring it into harmony with
CMS’s existing CLIA regulations and with the CLIA statute.329
323. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 1–2, 267.
324. Id. at 267.
325. Id. at 30, 267.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 267.
329. Although the Report ends up criticizing “[t]he current absolute prohibition on the return
of research results from non-CLIA-certified laboratories,” it presumes this prohibition to reflect
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Recommendation 12B suggests that “OCR should require all HIPAAcovered entities that conduct research on human biospecimens to develop
a plan that is reviewed and approved by the IRB for the release of
individual research results in the designated record set to participants in
a responsive manner when required under HIPAA.”330 This would
embroil IRBs in administering the Privacy Rule and would mark a major,
fundamental change to Congress’s overall scheme of federal privacy
enforcement, which relies on administrative enforcement by OCR rather
than on IRBs.331 HIPAA access is a legally enforceable privacy right,
with only narrow grounds for a covered entity to deny a person’s request
for HIPAA access.332 HHS has stated that it intends for covered entities
to invoke these access exceptions “rarely, if at all.”333 IRBs are often
staffed by personnel who work for the research institution that is storing
people’s data and may prefer not to release it to them. The Academies’
Report emphasizes that many institutions view HIPAA’s privacy
protections as costly and burdensome.334 Recommendation 12B takes a
vested federal legal right and reduces it to a right that can be denied, on a
case-by-case basis, based on ethical review by potentially conflicted
private actors. A legal right so restricted is no longer a legal right.
Recommendation 12B also is at odds with the 2017 Common Rule
revisions335 effective in January 2019.336 A major goal of the 2017
Common Rule revisions was to disentangle research safety regulation
from data privacy regulation.337 The revised Common Rule focuses IRB

the current regulations and recommends changing the regulations to eliminate the assumed, but
non-existent, prohibition. Id. at 248.
330. Id. at 267.
331. See discussion supra Part II.
332. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(2)–(3) (describing non-reviewable and reviewable grounds
for denial of access).
333. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg.
59,918, 59,980–82 (Nov. 3, 1999) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (discussing
exceptions to HIPAA’s access right in the 1999 preamble to the proposed Privacy Rule).
334. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 249.
335. See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149 (Jan. 19,
2017) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46).
336. See also Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects: Delay of the Revisions
to the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 83 Fed. Reg. 2885, 2885 (Jan. 22,
2018) (extending the effective date of the new Common Rule until July 19, 2018); Federal Policy
for the Protection of Human Subjects: Six Month Delay of the General Compliance Date of
Revisions While Allowing the Use of Three Burden-Reducing Provisions During the Delay
Period, 83 Fed. Reg. 28,497, 28,497 (June 19, 2018) (further delaying implementation until Jan.
21, 2019).
337. See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7151.
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oversight on the physical risks of research.338 The Common Rule—and
its IRBs—no longer will provide oversight for HIPAA-regulated uses and
disclosures of data for research, public health, and health-care
operations.339 This is to avoid duplication in cases where data privacy is
already protected by HIPAA.340 HHS devoted more than six years of
rulemaking effort to reduce IRBs’ role in privacy oversight, for which
HHS considers IRBs poorly qualified.341 The Academies’ Report
recommends upending that effort and embroiling IRBs in administering
the HIPAA Privacy Rule342—a role they have neither the time nor the
special knowledge to fulfill.
Recommendation 12A is surpassingly problematic from a legal
standpoint. It states that “the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) of the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) should define the DRS
to include only individual research results generated in a CLIA-certified
338. See, e.g., Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research
Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512,
44,514 (July 26, 2011) (to be codified in scattered sections of 21 and 45 C.F.R.) (discussing the
benefits of reducing Common Rule oversight of privacy risks in HIPAA-regulated informational
research); Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. 53,933, 53,938
(Sept. 8, 2015) (same).
339. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7261–62. This
regulation adopted a new provision at 46.104(d)(4)(iii) of the Code of Federal Regulations, which
provided:
Except as described in paragraph (a) of this section, the following categories of
human subjects research are exempt from this policy: . . . (4) Secondary research
. . . (iii) The research involves only information collection and analysis involving
the investigator’s use of identifiable health information when that use is regulated
under 45 CFR parts 160 and 164, subparts A and E, for the purposes of ‘health
care operations’ or ‘research’ as those terms are defined at 45 CFR 164.501 or
for ‘public health activities and purposes’ as described under 45 CFR
164.512(b) . . . .”
Id.

340. See id. at 7194 (“HIPAA also provides protections in the research context for the
information that would be subject to this exemption (e.g., clinical records), such that additional
Common Rule requirements for consent should be unnecessary in those contexts. . . . This
provision introduces a clearer distinction between when the Common Rule and the HIPAA
Privacy Rule apply to research in order to avoid duplication of regulatory burden. We believe that
the HIPAA protections are adequate for this type of research, and that it is unduly burdensome
and confusing to require applying the protections of both HIPAA and an additional set of
protections.”).
341. See Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research
Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. at 44,516
(“IRB review or oversight of research posing informational risks may not be the best way to
minimize the informational risks associated with data on human subjects. It is not clear that
members have appropriate expertise regarding data protections.”).
342. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 267.
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laboratory or under the externally accountable quality management
system for research laboratories (see Recommendation 2).”343 This
recommendation calls on OCR to violate three federal statutes: GINA’s
privacy provisions344 and sections of the Public Health Service Act345 and
the Social Security Act346 that GINA introduced. Recommendation 12A,
in effect, is a call for Congress to repeal the genetic privacy protections
that Congress mandated under GINA. It calls on OCR to take steps that
are unlawful, unless the statutes are repealed.
It is unclear how the Academies got into this awkward position. The
Academies’ Report included an appendix that discusses GINA’s
antidiscrimination provisions347—a puzzling inclusion in a report about
giving people their own data, because people do not discriminate against
themselves. The Report never discussed GINA’s privacy provisions,
which were highly pertinent to the Report’s subject matter because they
shaped today’s HIPAA access right.348 By enacting GINA, Congress
recognized that storing genetic information can place people’s privacy
and civil rights at risk even if the information is uncertain or lacks clinical
significance. The Public Health Service Act, as amended by GINA,
defines “genetic information” very broadly as including all information
and raw data from genetic tests conducted on an individual or the
individual’s family members, including from tests conducted in research
settings.349 This definition indisputably includes non-clinically-

343. Id. at 269.
344. See Pub. L. No. 110-223, §§ 102, 105, 122 Stat. 881 (2008).
345. Pub. L. No. 78-410, 58 Stat. 682 (1944) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201–
300mm-61 (2012)).
346. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301–
1397mm).
347. REPORT, supra note 10, app. at 333–37.
348. See discussion infra Section V.B.
349. See Pub. L. No. 110-223, § 102, 122 Stat. 881 (amending the Public Health Service Act
at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(d)(16) to define “genetic information” very broadly as including “with
respect to any individual, information about – (i) such individual’s genetic tests, (ii) the genetic
tests of family members of such individual, and (iii) the manifestation of a disease or disorder in
family members of such individual” and further including “genetic services, [and]
participation . . . [in] genetic [research]”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(d)(17)(A) (2012)
(defining “genetic test” as “mean[ing] an analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins,
or metabolites, that detects genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes” and thus clearly
including non-clinically-significant information, such as raw genomic data, within the scope of
information included in GINA’s definition of “genomic information); id. § 300gg-91(d)(18)
(defining “genetic services” as including “genetic test[s]” and “genetic counseling (including
obtaining, interpreting, or assessing genetic information)” and “genetic education,” such that
information from testing, assessing, and counseling occurring during the course of genetic
research is included in GINA’s broad definition of “genetic information.”).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol71/iss5/5

54

Evans and Wolf: A Faustian Bargain that Undermines Research Participants’ Privacy

2019]

A FAUSTIAN BARGAIN

1335

significant test results and raw data in addition to clinically significant
findings.350
GINA’s Section 105 ordered HHS to place all such information under
HIPAA’s privacy protections and amended the Social Security Act to
include a Congressional mandate that genetic information, as defined by
GINA’s broad definition, “shall be treated as health information” for
purposes of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.351 Thus, Congress deemed nonclinically-significant genetic information and data to be “health
information” for purposes of receiving protection under the HIPAA
Privacy Rule, even though such information and data might not be
regarded as “health information” in other legal contexts such as Medicare
billing or state medical practice regulations.
Recommendation 12A seeks to reverse GINA’s mandate to place all
“genetic information,” as defined by the Public Health Service Act, under
HIPAA’s privacy protections, which include HIPAA’s access right. This
is not something OCR can do through regulations. Only Congress could
make such a change, which seems unlikely. GINA is recent legislation—
from 2008—passed by overwhelming margins in both houses of
Congress; GINA passed the Senate by a vote of 95-0352 and the House by
a vote of 414-1.353 Discussion in the Senate and House before those votes
confirms that Congress viewed GINA’s privacy provisions as an
important element of the overall legislation.354 This dispels any
suggestion that Congress somehow passed GINA’s privacy provisions
inadvertently in the course of enacting GINA’s larger antidiscrimination

350. See Pub. L. No. 110-223, § 102, 122 Stat. 881.
351. See id. § 105 (adding a new § 1180 to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-9,
providing that “[t]he Secretary shall revise the HIPAA privacy regulation” so that “[g]enetic
information shall be treated as health information described in section 1320d(4)(B),” which was
the section of the Social Security Act added by the 1996 HIPAA statute in which Congress defined
the “health information” that is subject to HIPAA’s privacy protections).
352. 154 CONG. REC. 6841 (2008).
353. Id.
354. See 154 CONG. REC. 6831 (2008) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (noting the dangers of
genetic privacy violations and presenting evidence that “72 percent of Americans think laws are
needed to protect genetic privacy”); id. at 6832 (statement of Sen. Enzi) (noting the importance
of both privacy and data security protections); id. at 6834 (statement of Sen. Snowe) (noting that
the HIPAA regulations offer a framework for communication of information); see also id. at 7516
(statement of Rep. Miller) (emphasizing that Title I of GINA not only prevents discrimination in
health insurance based on genetic information but “also protects the privacy of this personal
information”); id. at 7517 (statement of Rep. Langevin) (“[T]he importance of . . . safeguarding
the right to privacy cannot be overstated.”); id. at 7518 (statement of Rep. Speier) (stating that the
passage of GINA “is a strong step toward protecting sensitive genetic information, but no journey
is completed in just one step” and calling for further work to “address[] the underlying problems
not fixed by this bill so we can truly protect Americans’ privacy”).
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package.355 After the House and Senate voted to enact GINA, the statute
has continued to enjoy strong bipartisan support. President George W.
Bush signed GINA into law in 2008,356 and the Obama administration
labored from 2009 to 2014 to craft regulations to implement GINA’s
genetic privacy mandate, including an individual right of access to
genetic information held at HIPAA-covered laboratories.
Recommendation 12A asks OCR to ignore this mandate.
A final problem is that the Report ignores HIPAA’s interaction with
state privacy laws. The HIPAA Privacy Rule sets a federal floor of
medical and genetic privacy protections: state laws providing “more
stringent” privacy protections are not preempted by HIPAA.357 HIPAA
regards a state privacy law as “more stringent” if it grants individuals
greater access to their own data than the Privacy Rule provides.358 Some
states provide individual access rights as part of their privacy laws,359 and
a few states have passed data-ownership laws360 which, under common
law principles, seemingly imply an individual right of access to the
owned res (the data).
Weakening HIPAA’s access right—as the Academies’ Report
recommends—would not necessarily liberate research laboratories from
having to respond to individual access requests. Instead, it might increase
the number of state access provisions that qualify as more stringent than
HIPAA’s access right. This, in turn, could increase laboratories’
regulatory compliance burdens. Instead of a uniform, national regime of
individual data access under HIPAA, laboratories might be forced to
comply with a complex patchwork of un-preempted state access
requirements.

355. Moreover, even if Congress somehow enacted GINA’s privacy provisions by mistake,
it is a well-settled canon of statutory construction that the enacted text of a statute determines the
law, regardless of what legislators allegedly intended to do. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra
note 197, at 369–90; see also MICHAEL B.W. SINCLAIR, GUIDE TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
103 (2000) (“[O]ur legislatures speak only through their statutes; statutes are their only voice;
statutes are law; extrinsic materials are not.”).
356. President Bush Signs the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008,
NHGRI (Mar. 17, 2012), https://www.genome.gov/27026050/president-bush-signs-the-geneticinformation-nondiscrimination-act-of-2008 [https://perma.cc/M4A4-5H7C].
357. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b) (2018) (providing that the HIPAA Privacy Rule does not
preempt state privacy laws that are “more stringent” than the Privacy Rule).
358. See id. at § 160.202 (defining “[m]ore stringent” as including state laws that “permit[]
greater rights of access” than the Privacy Rule provides (emphasis omitted)).
359. See, e.g., California Consumer Privacy Act, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3–4 (West).
360. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010(a)(2) (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-31104.7(1)(a) (2018); FLA. STAT. § 760.40(2)(a) (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1(1) (2018).
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C. Recommendations on the Return of Results and Data
Recommendations for return of research results have been published
for twenty years, beginning with the recommendations of the
presidentially appointed National Bioethics Advisory Commission in
1999.361 Remarkably, the Academies’ Report fails to consider the full set
of recommendations germane to its focus,362 return of results from
research involving human biospecimens. Moreover, the Report
mischaracterizes the recommendations already in print. In a particularly
egregious example, the Report attempts to depict its work as a rejection
of past recommendations and a new effort to prioritize what research
participants value:
In a notable departure from the approaches of past expert
groups, the committee has chosen to deemphasize the
respective influences of clinical and personal utility in
decisions regarding the return of individual research results
by focusing more inclusively on results that have “value to
participants,” with the understanding that the value of a
result from the perspective of the participant might entail
either clinical utility or personal utility or both and may also
arise from the result having personal meaning . . . .363
This characterization of past expert reports is incorrect. Multiple past
expert reports have emphasized the importance of assessing the value of
a result from the perspective of the participant. For example, well-known
recommendations produced by an NIH-supported project group state:
We show respect for research participants’ objective welfare
as well as their subjective interests by including [incidental
findings] of likely health or reproductive importance to the

361. See Section II.A.
362. Relevant consensus recommendations that the Academies’ Report fails to consider
include, but are not limited to: NAT’L CANCER INST., NCI BEST PRACTICES FOR BIOSPECIMEN
RESOURCES 38 (2016), https://biospecimens.cancer.gov/bestpractices/2016-NCIBestPractices.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VB52-4PNC]; Laura M. Beskow et al., Informed Consent for Population-Based
Research Involving Genetics, 286 JAMA 2315 (2001); Caulfield et al., supra note 68; Ellen
Wright Clayton et al., Informed Consent for Genetic Research on Stored Tissue Samples, 274
JAMA 1786 (1995). This list does not include relevant guidelines from outside the United States,
including from prominent international organizations. For discussion of international guidelines,
see, for example, Bartha M. Knoppers et al., Return of Genetic Testing Results in the Era of
Whole-Genome Sequencing, 16 NATURE REVS. GENETICS 553 (2015); Bartha M. Knoppers et al.,
The Emergence of an Ethical Duty to Disclose Genetic Research Results: International
Perspectives, 14 EUR. J. HUM. GENET. 1170 (2006); M’an Zawati et al., Incidental Findings in
Genomic Research: A Review of International Norms, 9:1 GENEDIT 1 (2011).
363. REPORT, supra note 10, at 151 (first emphasis added).
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participant. . . .
. . . [W]e define “utility” to include information that a
research participant is likely to find important, even if
clinicians cannot use that information to alter the
participant’s clinical course . . . . This rejects an approach to
utility grounded solely in what a clinician would find
useful.364
Based on this inadequate analysis, the Report makes multiple
recommendations on return of results that do not advance participants’
interests in access to results and data, but instead create roadblocks as
well as raising serious legal problems. Three of the more problematic
recommendations are shown in Table 4.

364. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings and Research Results in Biobanks, supra
note 68, at 232 (emphasis added). Subsequently, Fabsitz et al., supra note 68, at 577–78,
recommended that, “Investigators may choose to return individual genetic results to study
participants if . . . [t]he investigator has concluded that the potential benefits of disclosure
outweigh the risks from the participant’s perspective . . . .” Id. (second emphasis added). That
paper explained, “Researchers may choose to return individual results related to reproductive
risks, personal meaning or utility, or health risks . . . .” Id. at 578. A subsequent article drives the
point home. See Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research, supra
note 68, at 372 tbl.4 (showing that both Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings and Research
Results in Biobanks, supra note 68, and Fabsitz et al., supra note 68, urged assessing value “from
the participant’s perspective”); id. at 373 (“[T]he core question, as we suggested in our prior
project’s article, is whether return offers strong net benefit from the contributor’s perspective.”
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
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Table 4. A subset of problematic recommendations on
return of results in the Academies’ Report365
Rec. 2 NIH should lead an interagency effort . . . to develop an
externally accountable quality management system for nonCLIA-certified research laboratories testing human
biospecimens.366
Rec. 3 To provide confidence in the quality of research test results
disclosed to participants, institutions and their IRBs should
permit investigators to return individual research results if:
A. testing is conducted in a CLIA-certified laboratory; or
B. results are not intended for clinical decision making in
the study protocol . . . and testing is conducted under the
externally accountable quality management system for
research laboratories once established (see Recommendation
2); or
C. results are not intended for clinical decision making in
the study protocol . . . and the IRB determines that
1. the probability of value to the participant is
sufficiently high and the risks of harm are sufficiently
low to warrant return;
2. the quality of the laboratory analysis is sufficient
to provide confidence in the result to be returned, as
determined by a review process independent of the
laboratory; and
3. information will be provided to the participant(s)
regarding
limits
on
test
validity
and
interpretation . . . .367
Rec.
CMS should revise CLIA regulations to allow research
12D
results to be returned from a non-CLIA-certified laboratory
when they are not intended for clinical decision making in
the study protocol . . . and the laboratory conducts its testing
under the quality management system with external
accountability or the IRB has approved the return of results
(as described in Recommendation 3).368
Taken together, these recommendations would have the effect of
reducing the return of results below levels allowed under current ethical
guidelines. Recommendation 2 calls on the NIH to lead an effort to
develop a “quality management system,” or QMS, for “non-CLIA365.
366.
367.
368.

See REPORT, supra note 10, at 1–37 (summarizing all recommendations).
Id. at 17.
Id. at 17–19.
Id. at 30.
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certified research laboratories testing human biospecimens.”369 The
Report envisions the QMS would play a pivotal role in determining
whether participants can receive return of results from non-CLIAcompliant research laboratories.370 The Report’s Recommendation 3 thus
urges that research results be returned only when generated by a CLIAcompliant laboratory, produced by a laboratory that complies with a QMS
that does not yet exist, or approved by an IRB.371
The Report claims to champion return of results to research
participants.372 Yet Recommendation 3 creates roadblocks to return from
non-CLIA laboratories. The recommendation would allow return from a
non-CLIA laboratory if the laboratory complies with the QMS or if the
IRB approves the return (subject to various restrictions).373 This would
have the practical effect of restricting return more narrowly than current
consensus guidelines allow.374 Also, it conditions return on the success
of future efforts to create the QMS, which is far from assured and may
take years to complete, leaving return of results from non-CLIA research
laboratories in limbo. Under current guidelines, a non-CLIA research
laboratory can return results subject to pathways 2 and 3 discussed
above—that is, by seeking confirmation of the results to be returned at a
CLIA-certified lab, or by a clinical hand-off for clinical confirmation and
evaluation.375 Moreover, it is lawful to return results and data from a nonCLIA laboratory for non-clinical uses (such as to enable participants to
contribute their data to other research studies). The Report suggests that
these perfectly lawful and ethical current practices should be put on hold,
pending implementation of the QMS or IRB approval “case-by-case.”376
In addition to creating these practical roadblocks to return of results,
the Report seeks to alter the law itself. Recommendation 12D calls on
CMS to “revise the CLIA regulations to allow research results to be
returned from a non-CLIA-certified laboratory” if it complies with the
QMS or if an “IRB has approved the return of results (as described in
Recommendation 3).”377 This recommendation presents a number of
legal problems.

369. Id. at 17.
370. Id. at 96–97.
371. Id. at 17–19.
372. See, e.g., id. at 10–11.
373. See id. at 17–19, 121–24.
374. Wolf & Evans, Return of Results, supra note 69; Wolf & Evans, Defending Return of
Results, supra note 69.
375. See discussion supra Section V.A.
376. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 80–81.
377. Id. at 30.
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The Report indicates that CLIA statutory amendments lay outside the
committee’s statement of task.378 However, it would not be lawful for
CMS to implement Recommendation 12D, unless Congress first amends
the CLIA statute. CMS lacks the authority to impose requirements on
research laboratories that are not currently subject to CLIA. Congress
would need to amend CLIA’s jurisdictional provisions, in order for CMS
to have such authority.
Moreover, CMS has no authority to rely on a QMS or IRB approval
in circumstances in which CLIA compliance is already required. The
QMS program in Recommendation 2 is in the nature of a “CLIA-Lite”
program, designed to be less onerous for research laboratories than
regular CLIA certification would be. The current CLIA statute does not
recognize such an alternative: if a laboratory falls within CLIA’s
jurisdiction, then the only way to comply with CLIA is to comply with
CLIA. The CLIA statute envisions just two ways to comply: either obtain
a CLIA certificate,379 or else meet the criteria to be CLIA-exempt.380
CLIA exemption is only available to laboratories in certain states
(currently New York and Washington) that have state licensing
requirements that HHS has determined are equivalent to CLIA.381
Recommendation 12D calls for CMS to create a new exemption for
laboratories that comply with the QMS or follow the report’s IRB-review
policies.382 CMS lacks statutory authority to create new exemptions from
the CLIA statute’s compliance requirement. Only Congress can create
new exemptions from CLIA’s requirement that CLIA-regulated
laboratories must obtain a CLIA certificate. Once again,
Recommendation 12D is not lawful without CLIA statutory amendments.
When research laboratories do provide information intended for direct
use in clinical care without further confirmation, they need to comply
with CLIA. CLIA-Lite compliance is insufficient to ensure patient safety
in that scenario. Recommendation 12D would allow research laboratories
to return research results, even for immediate use in clinical care, if they
comply with the QMS system or obtain IRB approval. This would violate
the current CLIA statute and set a lower standard of patient safety than is
required in pathways 1-3 of the current guidelines (as all three of the

378. Id. at 9 (noting that the committee that drafted the report “was not asked to make
recommendations to Congress regarding changes to the CLIA law”).
379. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(b) (2012).
380. Id. § 263a(p)(2).
381. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., LIST OF EXEMPT STATES UNDER THE CLINICAL
LABORATORY IMPROVEMENT AMENDMENTS (CLIA), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Legislation/CLIA/Downloads/ExemptStatesList.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PV2-33SK].
382. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 30, 267–68.
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currently recognized pathways would generate CLIA-compliant results
before those results were used in clinical care).
Finally, the Report recommends that NIH lead development of the
QMS.383 Yet this new quality system is envisioned as a massive effort to
govern the conduct and quality of all research involving human
biospecimens. The proposal reaches far beyond return of results and far
beyond laboratories conducting NIH-funded research. The QMS and the
Report’s recommended CLIA amendments would affect privately
funded, commercial research laboratories as well as NIH-funded
laboratories. However, the National Institutes of Health, which was a
sponsor of the Report, is not the right entity to govern the laboratories
whose research it funds plus competing laboratories in the private sector.
NIH has an obvious conflict of interest. In addition, NIH has no authority
under the current CLIA statute and regulatory scheme to govern the
quality of private laboratories that receive no NIH funds and to apply a
QMS as a condition of return of results. Finally, NIH is not the
appropriate entity to govern consumer safety in laboratory practice, as
NIH would ultimately bear the costs of imposing more stringent safety
standards on its funded researchers. Congress has entrusted CMS to serve
as the consumer-safety regulator.
CONCLUSION
Despite CMS’s menacing PDF file, some research laboratories have
continued to respect the rights of research participants by providing
HIPAA access and offering return of research results according to
established ethical guidelines.384 This response has required three things:
(1) an unwavering commitment to research participants’ rights and to
strong data privacy protections; (2) courage; and (3) access to qualified
legal counsel.
Agency guidance documents, such as the PDF file, have no binding
legal force independent of the regulations they interpret or implement.385
383. See, e.g., id. at 17 (“NIH should lead an interagency effort including nongovernmental
stake-holders to develop an externally accountable quality management system for non-CLIAcertified research laboratories testing human biospecimens.”).
384. Id. app. at 318 (“[T]here is anecdotal evidence that institutional policies prohibiting the
return of results generated by research laboratories are being overruled in some instances. For
example, a qualitative interview study of 31 IRB professionals at six sites across the United States
reported two cases in which research test results that could not be confirmed in CLIA-certified
laboratories were nevertheless reported to individual research participants. . . . Although
additional instances have been noted in the literature, the frequency with which these decisions
are being made in practice is unclear.” (footnotes omitted)).
385. Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 347 (“This [lack of independent legal force] means that
a person who is alleged to have violated an agency’s regulatory law must be shown to have
violated the underlying statute or legislative rule [i.e., regulation] that the agency is implementing;
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A laboratory with qualified counsel would know that guidances are nonbinding and is likely to know when a guidance misstates the law, as the
PDF file does. This does not imply, however, that such a laboratory will
necessarily resist an erroneous agency position statement. A non-binding
guidance often induces “grudging compliance, ‘even when the doubts as
to the lawfulness of the [guidance] are substantial.’”386 The practical
reality is that even a flawed guidance document “still establishes the law
for all those unwilling to pay the expense, or suffer the ill-will of
challenging the agency in court.”387 When this happens, the guidance is
said to be “practically binding”388 even though it is not legally binding in
the sense that the agency would be able to enforce it.389
The practical binding effect of a flawed guidance, such as CMS’s PDF
file, may be even more pronounced in the case of research laboratories,
staffed by scientists without training in the law, who are driven by the
quest for scientific truth and funded by grants that include no budget for
legal counsel. Research laboratories may comply out of a mistaken belief
that anything a regulator says must be the law.
One of the most unfortunate aspects of the Academies’ Report is that
it undercuts the reasoned positions of laboratories that have done their
homework, analyzed the law, and courageously continued to honor
research participants’ rights. The Academies’ Report has exacerbated the
confusion in an already confused legal landscape by reciting CMS’s
position as if it were legally correct and following instructions from the
study sponsors “to include in its description of the current regulatory
environment for the return of individual research results the CMS’s
current interpretation of the scope and applicability of CLIA.”390
We urge policymakers, investigators, and institutions to exercise
extreme caution in implementing the regulatory recommendations of this
Report. This Article has tried to fill some of the gaps in legal analysis that
produced a set of flawed—and, in some cases, unlawful—

it is not sufficient for the agency to demonstrate that the person violated [the guidance
document].”).
386. Croston, supra note 178, at 387 (alteration in original) (quoting William Funk, A Primer
on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321, 1340 (2001)).
387. Mendelson, supra note 182, at 400 (quoting Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between
Formal and Informal Modes of Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 167 (2000)).
388. See Anthony, supra note 301, at 1315.
389. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[A]n
agency’s [guidance document] can as a practical matter, have a binding effect. If an agency acts
as if a document issued at headquarters is controlling in the field, if it treats the document in the
same manner as it treats a legislative rule . . . [and] if it leads private parties . . . to believe that
[the agency] will [apply the policy expressed in the document], then the agency’s document is for
all practical purposes ‘binding.’”).
390. REPORT, supra note 10, at 9.
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recommendations. Further case-specific legal due diligence is advisable
before acting on the regulatory recommendations of this Report.
The root causes of this problem included a flawed statement of task
that misstated federal law and constrained the committee’s ability to
conduct a thorough, complete, and professional legal analysis. This
Report represents a rare deviation from the Academies’ usual, rigorous
policies surrounding the preparation of reports. This Article strives to
illuminate the root causes in the hope that shedding light on what
happened might help keep it from happening again. Agreeing to abstain
from analyzing a highly disputed position asserted by an agency
sponsoring a committee report endangers the quality of the report, the
persuasiveness of its recommendations, and ultimately the Academies’
reputation. Legal analysis, like medical and scientific analysis, demands
rigor. In law, as in mathematics, Π does not equal 6.
The harm of these recommendations extends beyond the narrow
context—biomedical research—on which the Academies focused their
Report. In an unbroken line starting with the Fair Credit Reporting Act of
1970 and extending through GINA in 2008, Congress has consistently
treated the individual right of access to one’s own data as a foundational
civil right—a core privacy protection that enables people to exercise
many other rights including some enjoying constitutional protection. By
advancing a view that privacy rights can be discarded when they grow
burdensome, costly, or detrimental to productivity, the National
Academies’ Report sows confusion about what rights are and why they
matter. This confusion, emanating from so respected a source, diminishes
Americans’ privacy rights more generally.
A recent article on the front page of the New York Times illustrated
the pivotal importance of honoring rights of access to one’s personal
information. The article discussed the plight of China’s Uighurs,
subjected to unconsented genetic testing as a tool of social control:
The authorities called it a free health check. Tahir Imin
had his doubts. They drew blood from the 38-year-old
Muslim, scanned his face, recorded his voice and took his
fingerprints. They didn’t bother to check his heart or
kidneys, and they rebuffed his request to see the results.
“They said, ‘You don’t have the right to ask about
this . . . .’”391
Even in the United States, many individuals, after consenting to
genomic research, still encounter barriers to seeing their test results and
data. Like the Uighurs in China, they are frequently told, “You don’t have
the right to ask about this.” Access to one’s own personal information is
391. Wee, supra note 18.
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an essential right protected by multiple statutes Congress has enacted
since 1970. The recent Report of the National Academies undermined
rights that are protected by American law and crucial to the ethical
conduct of research.
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